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I. INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 represented a seminal legislative
accomplishment of the twentieth century. Its eleven titles addressed racial
discrimination in voting (Title I), public accommodations (Title II), public
facilities (Title III), public education (Title IV), publicly financed programs
(Title VI) and employment (Title VII).2 It sought to remedy legislatively the
Jim Crow laws and practices that had long contributed to making blacks
second-class citizens in America and it provided the Executive Branch tools,
especially in Title III and VI, to help implement Brown v. Board of Education.3
In view of the bill’s focus on racial discrimination, one would expect the
legislative discussion to have centered around the injustice of segregation and
the burden it imposed on American society. Much of it did. Yet legislators
devoted a substantial portion of their attention to constitutional issues relevant
to the bill.
Academic discussions of constitutional interpretation tend to focus on the
work of the federal judiciary generally and the Supreme Court specifically.
Constitutional law, especially at America’s law schools but more universally,
too, focuses on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. In recent years,
however, a number of scholars have noted that a significant body of
constitutional interpretation does, and should, occur outside of the courts, in
the executive and legislative branches of our federal government.4 Abundant

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to Anthony Gilbert,
Jackie Loerop, and Tim McFarlin for their able research assistance, to Margaret McDermott, J.D.
for her help with various references, and to Mary Dougherty for patiently retyping the
manuscript. All shortcomings are my responsibility, not theirs.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237
(2001).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004);
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL
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examples exist of constitutional discussion outside the judiciary. Yet it is hard
to imagine an instance where constitutional interpretation so dominated
discussion of proposed legislation as was the case with the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The executive and legislative branches engaged in an extensive dialogue
that focused heavily on the constitutional issues, real and imagined, which the
proposed legislation raised.5 The discussion was wide-ranging, touching on a
number of areas of constitutional law. To be sure, some legislators and
witnesses advanced dubious constitutional notions to serve political ends, yet
much of the discussion was serious, informed, and thoughtful. It reflected
different understandings of constitutional language and history, competing
visions of key concepts of constitutional law, and an earnest effort to grapple
with judicial precedents and past legislative activity. Congressional leaders
held hearings, in part, to “produce a final record clarifying the constitutional
powers of Congress to act in this field.”6 Whereas proponents found clear and
pervasive constitutional authority, opponents labeled constitutional objections
“insurmountable”7 and prophesied that passage would spell the end of
constitutional government in America.8
Although Congress debated the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, much of the debate focused on whether Title II,
addressing discrimination in places of public accommodations, was
constitutional. It was appropriate that it did. Title II addressed a pressing
national problem. In the early 1960s, the second-class status of blacks in
America was nowhere more evident than in the segregated patterns of service
which persisted in Southern states. At restaurants, motels, and other
businesses ostensibly open to the public, blacks were routinely denied service
or served at separate facilities or areas.
Of the three branches of the national government, the Court had, of course,
been the most progressive during the 1950s and early 1960s in addressing Jim
PROCESS (1988); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
5. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1151 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights—Public
Accommodations] (statement of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey) (“A great deal of time has been
expended . . . on the Commerce Clause. . . .”).
6. Id. at 1 (statements of Sen. Warren G. Magnuson); id. at 180 (statement of Sen. Philip A.
Hart) (“It is important that we have the most careful analysis of the appropriate constitutional
powers which are available on which to base our legislative proposals.”).
7. Id. at 884 (testimony of Gov. Donald Russell).
8. Civil Rights—The President’s Program, 1963: Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 36 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights—President’s
Program] (statements of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr.) (“[W]e might as well throw the Constitution
out the window. . . .”); see also Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on
Rules, 88th Cong. 388 (1964) [hereinafter Rules Committee] (statement of Rep. William M.
Tuck) (arguing that the Act “destroys our Constitution and shatters our Bill of Rights”).
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Crow laws and practices. Under Chief Justice Earl Warren’s leadership, the
Court had struck down discriminatory practices, generally in unanimous
decisions. Although the Court had declared “separate but equal” treatment a
denial of equal protection in public schools9 and other state-operated facilities
during the 1950s, it had not held that the Constitution precluded private
entrepreneurs from discriminating based on race. By the early 1960s, the
Court had gone about as far as it could go on that issue without splintering. A
series of “sit-in” cases raised the constitutionality of private discrimination in
places of public accommodation. The Court reached a constitutional impasse
by the spring of 1963.10
At that same time, independently and coincidentally, the political branches
commenced a “constitutional dialogue”11 that ultimately resulted in a political
resolution to the issue that stymied the Court. Much of the discussion centered
on the scope of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment,
potential sources of congressional power for the legislation, and the concepts
of federalism and government regulation of private property.
The
constitutional debate involved two separate discussions. One addressed
whether Title II was constitutional. Proponents argued that the Commerce
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress ample
authority to pass Title II. Critics claimed the legislation would expand the
power of the federal government at the expense of the states.12 The Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution reserved the police power to the states.13 If
“the theory” behind Title II was valid, the Federal Government could “regulate
and coerce every activity, whether State or individual, within the bounds of
any and every State.”14 The legislation would deprive of property those
operating places of public accommodations without due process of law.15
The discussion did not, however, simply turn on whether the legislation
was constitutional. A second debate, among proponents of the bill, turned on
whether the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment furnished the
proper basis for Title II.
This Article presents a case study of the constitutional discussion regarding
Title II. The legislative discussion of Title II provided a rich consideration of

9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–
99 (1954).
10. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights Since 1940:
Opportunities and Limitations, 4 BARRY L. REV. 39, 51 n.78 (2003) (discussing the Court’s
“ongoing internal dispute resulting from the sit-in movement”).
11. I take the term from FISHER, supra note 4.
12. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 83–84 (statements of Sen.
Strom Thurmond).
13. Id. at 85.
14. Id. at 88.
15. Id. at 84.
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constitutional issues. Although officials of the executive branch did much of
the heavy lifting, many legislators were heavily engaged, especially in
expressing constitutional objections to the legislation and in formulating the
case for using the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the exchange represented
an often ignored phenomenon—constitutional dialogue in the political
branches. Legislators took seriously their duty to interpret the Constitution.
They did so, though, with the understanding that the Supreme Court was the
ultimate constitutional interpreter. They sought to craft legislation that would
coincide with the Court’s constitutional conclusions. The executive–legislative
discussion of constitutional issues raised theories of constitutional
interpretation that generally did not find a judicial voice. Moreover, the
constitutional dialogue included the Supreme Court.
The legislative
discussion, and the decisions which flowed from it, profoundly influenced the
constitutional issues the Court faced. Indeed, the political branches played a
significant role in addressing and resolving the constitutional issues involved,
and ultimately the Court was disposed to defer to it.
II. PROPOSING LEGISLATION: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The Kennedy Administration had moved slowly regarding Civil Rights
legislation in early 1963, offering very modest legislation in February of that
year, which focused on voting rights. The Administration had concluded that
there was little interest in civil rights, in Congress or the country.16 As Burke
Marshall, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, put it, “the
problem of the Negro was still invisible to the country at large until the spring
of 1963.”17 As such, prospects for legislative success seemed unlikely.18
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield thought a Democratic President could
not produce civil rights legislation.19 Mansfield’s predecessor, Vice President
Lyndon B. Johnson, was also pessimistic.20

16. Third Oral History, Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, at 65 (June 13,
1964) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program).
17. Id. at 61 (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program)
(proposing legislation would be “gesture”); Seventh recorded interview by Anthony Lewis with
Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall, at 549 (Dec. 22, 1964) (transcript available in the John F.
Kennedy Library, Oral History Program) (stating no public demand for legislation before
Birmingham).
18. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 110 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert
F. Kennedy); see also Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, supra note 16, at 65.
19. Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, supra note 16, at 106; Seventh
recorded interview by Anthony Lewis with Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall, supra note
17, at 549–50; Fifth recorded Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshal, at 106–07 (June
20, 1964) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program).
20. Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, supra note 16, at 112.
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Civil rights protests had placed on the Supreme Court’s docket in the early
1960s the issue of racial discrimination in public places. Black students in a
number of Southern states staged peaceful sit-ins at lunch counters or other
segregated facilities. The students, having been routinely arrested and
convicted, challenged these events as denials of their right to Equal Protection
of the laws. Although petitioners asked the Court to find state action in the
police conduct and judicial enforcement,21 the Court proceeded more
cautiously, ruling for plaintiffs but on narrower grounds that avoided the
constitutional issue. For instance, in Garner v. Louisiana,22 the Court struck
down convictions of protestors for disturbing the peace but did so on the
narrow grounds that the convictions were so lacking in evidentiary support that
they violated Due Process.23 Only Justice Douglas was prepared to reach the
ultimate constitutional issue and find an Equal Protection violation. He argued
that restaurants, though “private enterprises,” were “public facilities in which
the States may not enforce a policy of racial segregation.”24 Louisiana could
not enforce through executive or judicial action25 its “custom”26 of segregation
in private businesses affected with a public interest.
During the 1962 term, the Court considered six other “sit-in” cases.27 In
four of the cases,28 state courts had convicted students, most of whom were
African-Americans, of trespass for staging sit-ins at segregated lunch counters.
In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, two African-American ministers were
convicted of aiding and abetting a violation of Birmingham, Alabama’s
criminal trespass code by encouraging two college students to stage the sit-in
at issue in Gober.29 In Wright v. Georgia, six Negro youths were convicted for
breach of the peace “for peacefully playing basketball in a public park in
Savannah, Georgia, on the early afternoon of Monday, January 23, 1961.”30 In
near unanimous decisions announced on May 20, 1963, the Court reversed the
convictions in all of the cases.

21. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 307 (1994).
22. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
23. Id. at 163.
24. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 178, 179.
26. Id. at 181.
27. Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S.
374 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Petersen v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
28. Avent, 373 U.S. 375; Gober, 373 U.S. 374; Lombard, 373 U.S. at 268–69; Petersen, 373
U.S. at 245.
29. Shuttlesworth, 373 U.S. at 263.
30. Wright, 373 U.S. at 285.
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In the five “sit-in” cases, petitioners claimed in part that their rights to
Equal Protection of the laws were violated by their arrests. In three of the
cases, local ordinances mandated racial segregation in restaurants.31 In these
cases, the Court held that the presence of the ordinance foreclosed any defense
that the entrepreneur was exercising private choice.
When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discriminate against
other persons because of race, and the State’s criminal processes are employed
in a way which enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a
palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by
attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators.32

No New Orleans ordinance prohibited the McCrory Five and Ten Cent
Store from serving blacks.33 Accordingly, the Court could not resolve the state
action riddle so easily in Lombard v. Louisiana, a case in which students were
arrested for sitting in at a whites-only lunch counter.34 Yet a few days before
the students were arrested, the Superintendent of Police and the Mayor of New
Orleans had declared in widely publicized statements that the police would act
to stop sit-in demonstrations.35 The Court construed the statements as
endorsing segregated service and, accordingly, deemed them to be the
equivalent of local ordinances to that effect.36 Similarly, in Wright v. Georgia,
the Court found state action in the police conduct in arresting the Negro
basketball players in a public park. The officers acted as they did “to enforce
racial discrimination in the park.”37
The presence of ordinances or constructive ordinances in the cases decided
during the 1962 term allowed the Court to dodge the basic constitutional
question: Did the Equal Protection Clause preclude a private entrepreneur from
refusing services to blacks based on their race? In each case, the Court could
plausibly attribute the refusal to serve blacks to public policy, not private
choice. The near unanimous decisions on the narrow issues concealed a
significant division in the Court on the basic constitutional issue that the “sitin” cases raised.
Some, like Justice Black, believed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
preclude a private entrepreneur from refusing to serve blacks in his restaurant.
During the Court’s conference on November 9, 1962, he said:

31. See, e.g., Avent, 373 U.S. at 257 n.8 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gober, 373 U.S. at 255 n.4
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Petersen, 373 U.S. at 246–47.
32. Petersen, 373 U.S. at 248.
33. Lombard, 373 U.S. at 268.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 269–70.
36. Id. at 273.
37. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292 (1963).
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We have a system of private ownership of property—we should not turn down
these rights by constitutional construction. I believe that a store owner, the
same as a home owner, has a right to say who can come on his premises and
how long they can stay. A store owner, like a house owner, can tell a customer
to leave. If he has that right, he cannot be helpless to call the police and get
help to throw the customer out. One man on another man’s property can be
thrown off with force, if necessary. That rule is necessary if private property is
to be protected. I would rank stores along with homes, although there is, of
course, a difference in history and sentiment.38

Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart agreed with Black’s views.39 On the
contrary, Justice Douglas thought such segregation unconstitutional, a view
with which Justice Goldberg sympathized.40 Goldberg did not, however, join
Douglas’s concurrence in Lombard. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan
urged the ultimate strategy adopted in order to decide the cases in a nearunanimous fashion without reaching the basic, and divisive, constitutional
issue.
As the Court reached an impasse on the constitutional issue, events at
Birmingham changed the political landscape. The events there and elsewhere
in the spring of 1963 transformed public opinion. National television
audiences witnessed Bull Connor’s police commit barbaric assaults on
“defenseless schoolchildren,” attacking them with clubs, fire hoses, and dogs
The brutal display was a national
during a Good Friday march.41
embarrassment. The events moved the Kennedy Administration to expand the
legislative proposals it had offered earlier that year.42 On June 11, 1963,
President Kennedy gave an eloquent nationally broadcast address in which he
outlined the civil rights legislation he would propose. The “moral issue”
involved was “as old as the scriptures and . . . as clear as the American
Constitution,”43 said Kennedy. The President followed his address with more
sweeping legislative proposals which formed the basis of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.

38. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 712 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
39. Id. at 714–16.
40. Id. at 714, 716.
41. Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 907 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights] (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
42. John F. Kennedy, The President’s News Conference (May 22, 1963), in THE PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, JAN. 1–NOV. 22, 1963,
at 423 (1964); John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil
Rights (June 11, 1963), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
JOHN F. KENNEDY, JAN. 1–NOV. 22, 1963, at 469 [hereinafter Radio and Television Report]
(“The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or
State or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them.”).
43. Radio and Television Report, supra note 42, at 469.
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Kennedy met on several occasions in June 1963 with legislative leaders to
discuss the proposed legislation. The Administration’s proposal won broad
support from leadership except Republican Leader Everett Dirksen who
initially balked at supporting Title II dealing with discrimination in places of
public accommodations.44 Ultimately, Senator Mike Mansfield introduced the
Administration’s bill, S. 1731, and he and Dirksen introduced S. 1750, the
same bill without the public accommodations provision Dirksen was not
prepared to support.45 That section was introduced as S. 1732.46 S. 1731 and
S. 1750 were referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee; S. 1732 was referred
to the Senate Commerce Committee.47 In the House, Representative Emanuel
Celler introduced the Administration’s bill, H.R. 7152, which was referred to
the Judiciary Committee that he chaired.48
Much of the discussions addressed the constitutional basis of the public
accommodations section of the proposed bill, Title II. To a great extent, it
paralleled the 1875 Civil Rights Act.49 The 1875 Act had rested on section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment and had imposed criminal sanctions for anyone
who prevented someone from using railroads, hotels, or theaters based on their
race.50 In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court held the Act unconstitutional
because the Fourteenth Amendment reached only State, not private, action.51
Like its nineteenth-century predecessor, Title II prohibited owners of hotels,
restaurants, and other places of public accommodations from discriminating
based on race. Southerners insisted that precedent rendered Title II
unconstitutional.52 The Court had not, however, ruled that Congress lacked
power under the Commerce Clause to pass a public accommodations bill like
Title II. The Civil Rights Cases had specifically not considered whether the
Commerce Clause authorized the 1875 Act.53
Not all thought the Constitution as clear as President Kennedy suggested.
While opponents of civil rights legislation denied that the Federal Government
had any power to act, those sympathetic to the cause divided between two
theories of constitutional power. On the one hand, section 1 the Fourteenth
Amendment forbade States from denying any person the equal protection of
44. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART
15–16 (2001).
45. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 23–25 (statements of Sen. Everett
Dirksen).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18–19 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2413.
49. 18 Stat. 235 (1875).
50. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9–10 (1883).
51. Id. at 11.
52. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 473 (statement of Gov.
George Wallace); id. at 500–01 (statements of Gov. George Wallace and Sen. Strom Thurmond).
53. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18, 19.
OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES
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the law.54 Section 5 empowered Congress to enforce the terms of the
Amendment.55 The Equal Protection Clause, which was designed largely to
redress racial subordination of blacks, seemed to speak most directly to the
“moral issue.” Some thought the Administration could best demonstrate its
sincerity on the moral issue by relying on the Fourteenth Amendment.56 Yet
much discrimination arguably involved private action, and the Supreme Court
in The Civil Rights Cases had held that Congress could only address “state
action,” not private discriminatory conduct, under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Alternatively, the Commerce Clause, which allowed Congress to regulate
commerce among the states, had proved an efficacious instrument to address a
host of problems, including some intrastate activities which affected the
national economy. Yet the Commerce Clause’s main focus was not race, and
some worried that its use would signal broader federal regulation.
The choice between the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
had partisan ramifications, too. History linked the Republican Party to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Democratic Party to the Commerce Clause.57
Republican votes would be needed to pass legislation, especially in the Senate
where a two-thirds vote was required to stop a filibuster; but in 1963,
Republicans still associated the Commerce Clause with Franklin D. Roosevelt
and were loath to use that provision as the constitutional basis for the bill.58
Republicans might be more willing to support Kennedy’s legislation if it rested
on the Fourteenth Amendment.
The discussion regarding the proper basis for the Civil Rights bill extended
to the highest levels of the executive branch. President Kennedy “raised a
question” regarding the constitutional basis of the proposed legislation that
resulted in “quite a number of conversations.”59 Indeed, Robert F. Kennedy
recalled more time being spent on the constitutional issue than on any other
facet of the proposal.60 The Kennedys had doubts regarding the issue and
initially favored using the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commerce Clause had
important Justice Department advocates, too, namely Burke Marshall and

54. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
55. Id. § 5.
56. See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Rights Bill Strategy: Sidestepping of the 14th Amendment in
Kennedy Proposal Examined Bright Light ‘Narrow’ Grounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1963, at 115.
57. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1870 (statement of Joseph D. Rauh); id. at 1947
(statement of Walter Reuther).
58. Interview by Larry J. Hackman with Burke Marshall, as Assistant Attorney General for
the Civil Rights Division, at 4–5 (Jan. 19–20, 1970) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy
Library, Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program).
59. Interview by Anthony Lewis with Robert F. Kennedy, at 498 (Dec. 1964) (transcript
available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program).
60. Id.
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Archibald Cox.61 Ultimately Marshall’s arguments apparently convinced the
Kennedys.62
Strategic considerations also shaped the Administration’s approach. A bill
resting on the Commerce Clause would come under the jurisdiction of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, which progressive Senator Warren
Magnuson chaired. A bill predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment would
have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee chaired by arch
segregationist Senator James Eastland of Mississippi.63
III. CONGRESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A.

The Commerce Clause

Congressional proponents of Title II divided over the constitutional basis
for the legislation. Some emphasized the Commerce Clause,64 others the
Fourteenth Amendment.65 A third group declined to choose between the two
approaches66 or thought it prudent to rely on both.67 The Kennedy
Administration relied on both provisions, but placed principal emphasis on the
Commerce Clause.68 During the course of the summer of 1963, the
Administration’s emphasis on the Commerce Clause increased.
The
Administration’s reliance on the Commerce Clause as the constitutional basis
for Title II turned largely on its conclusion that it clearly gave Congress
authority to legislate.69 Robert Kennedy thought “[t]here is no question but
61. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 28 (testimony of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy).
62. ROBERT KENNEDY: IN HIS OWN WORDS 174 (Edwin O. Guthman & Jeffery Shulman
eds., 1988).
63. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 838 (comments of Sen. John
Pastore).
64. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 96 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert
F. Kennedy) (stating that the Administration bill “relies primarily on the commerce clause”).
65. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 795–96 (statement of
Sen. John Sherman Cooper); Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 2586 (testimony of Rep. Richard S.
Schweiker).
66. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 776 (testimony of Dean
Erwin Griswold) (calling both approaches “strong and embracing” and advocating use of both);
Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1874 (testimony of Joseph Rauh).
67. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1152 (statement of Sen.
Hubert H. Humphrey); id. at 273–74 (letter from Prof. Louis H. Pollak).
68. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1376 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy)
(“rely[ing] primarily upon the commerce clause”); id. at 1387–88 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert
F. Kennedy).
69. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 28 (statement of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); Civil Rights, supra
note 41, at 1376 (statement of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (stating that there can be “no real
question” about Congress’s authority under Commerce Clause).
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that the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality” of Title II.70 To be
sure, the bill addressed a “moral issue,” but Congress had attacked other moral
issues—child labor, prostitution, gambling—under the Commerce Clause.71
The Kennedy Administration made the opening pitch as Congress debated
the scope of the Commerce Clause. Robert Kennedy testified before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and before the Senate
Committees on Commerce and on the Judiciary. Much of his testimony
addressed constitutional issues as did that of his associate, Burke Marshall.
Kennedy first appeared before the House subcommittee on June 26, 1963, and
his approach there was illustrative. Although much of his presentation
outlined the proposed legislation and its moral justifications, Kennedy devoted
fourteen paragraphs to the constitutional issues.72 Kennedy pointed out that
two constitutional provisions related to Title II: the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment.73 The former granted Congress “extensive power” to
address “practices which burden the free flow of interstate commerce or
otherwise affect national trade.”74 “There can be no real question about the
authority of the Congress to deal with discriminatory practices by enterprises
whose business affects interstate commerce or interstate travel.”75
Discrimination at places of public accommodation clearly affected
interstate commerce and travel. The restrictions imposed on Negro travelers
burdened interstate travel. “Our whole economy suffers,” said Kennedy, and
“the Nation’s business is impaired.”76 Business did not move into areas that
practiced discrimination. Travel and commerce were reduced. Even local
discrimination imposed a “squeeze” on commerce.77
Kennedy offered the Equal Protection Clause as an alternative basis.78
Much had changed since the Court decided The Civil Rights Cases, said
Kennedy.79 Changes in social facts might cause the Court to view Congress’s
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment differently.80 Kennedy
thought, on June 26, 1963, at least, that the contemporary Court would reverse
The Civil Rights Cases and uphold Title II.81 Still, the Commerce Clause was
a safer, less controversial basis.
70. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 156; see also id. at 166–67.
71. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 96 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert
F. Kennedy).
72. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1375–77.
73. Id. at 1375–76.
74. Id.; see also id. at 1389.
75. Id. at 1376.
76. Id. at 1374.
77. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1374 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy).
78. Id. at 1387–88.
79. Id. at 1376.
80. Id. at 1376, 1387.
81. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1395, 1410, 1415, 1417.
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Five days later, Kennedy began similar testimony to the Senate Commerce
Committee, which he gave over a three-day period.82 Again, in his opening
statement, he emphasized the Commerce Clause as the safest basis for Title II
while opining that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided a suitable,
but more constitutionally controversial, alternative.83 He added an important
wrinkle to his presentation. To rebut the contention that Title II infringed on
rights of private property, he presented thirty-six federal statutes in which
Congress had regulated private business under the Commerce Clause.84 He
also offered a list of statutes and ordinances in nine Southern states that
required private businesses to segregate.85 Private business could hardly claim
regulatory immunity if Congress and state legislatures had been subjecting it to
such measures for so long. Much of Kennedy’s testimony related to
constitutional issues raised by questions from Committee members. For
instance, Senators John Pastore, Norris Cotton, Thruston Morton, and Frank
Lausche quizzed the Attorney General regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.86
Senator Mike Monroney focused on the scope of the Commerce Clause.87
Senator Strom Thurmond questioned Kennedy on a range of constitutional
issues relating to Title II, which covered more than thirty-five pages of the
hearings on July 1.88
Burke Marshall followed Kennedy to the witness stand before the Senate
Commerce Committee after the July 4 break. While the first half of his
opening statement addressed the moral basis of Title II, the second half
addressed constitutional issues.89 He discussed “additional aspects” of the
Commerce Clause rationale that supported the Administration’s “belief that
legislation enacted pursuant to that clause would be clearly constitutional.”90
His statement was apparently designed to fill gaps in Kennedy’s testimony and
to address subjects committee questions had raised. For instance, he began by
stating reasons why “discrimination itself . . . adversely affects interstate
commerce.”91 He explained:
Section 2 of the bill describes in detail the effect of racial discrimination on
national commerce. Discrimination burdens Negro interstate travelers and
thereby inhibits interstate travel. It artificially restricts the market available for
interstate goods and services. It leads to the withholding of patronage by

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 17.
Id. at 23, 27–28.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 25–28, 57–58, 73–75, 76–78.
Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 66–71.
Id. at 83–120.
Id. at 205–07.
Id. at 206.
Id.
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potential customers for such goods and services. It inhibits the holding of
conventions and meetings in segregated cities. It interferes with businesses that
wish to obtain the services of persons who do not choose to subject themselves
to segregation and discrimination. And it restricts business enterprises in their
choice of location for offices and plants, thus preventing the most effective
allocation of national resources.92

He also cited substantial precedent to support the proposition that Congress
could regulate intrastate activity that affected interstate commerce.93
Finally, Kennedy testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee for nine
days beginning July 18, 1963.94 Much of the testimony related to Title II and
constitutional issues pertaining to it.
Kennedy again noted the
Administration’s primary reliance on the Commerce Clause.95 The Fourteenth
Amendment raised “very far-reaching and grave issues” that Kennedy
outlined, especially relating to the licensing theory of state action which was
the basis of legislation Senator John Sherman Cooper and Senator Thomas
Dodd had introduced.96 Still, the Administration was prepared to draw upon
the Fourteenth Amendment to attack conventional forms of state action.97
Senator Sam Ervin interrogated Kennedy at length for the nine days, often on
constitutional issues.
Kennedy and Marshall were by no means the sole spokespersons for the
Commerce Clause approach. Other Democrats also noted the capacious nature
of the Commerce Clause. Congress had used this “most sweeping and
significant direct source of power available to the National Government” in
“many and varied ways to meet the changing nature of our Nation’s life and
economy.”98 Senator Philip Hart explained that the clause helped promote the
movement of goods in interstate commerce, remove obstacles to commerce,
stimulate commerce, and even to prohibit intrastate activities “which interfere
or obstruct in a substantial way the freedom of commerce between the
States.”99 Senator Warren Magnuson also articulated an expansive view of the
black letter law relating to the clause that was articulated more than two
decades earlier:
The Court has held over and over again that the power of Congress over
interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce between

92. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 206–07.
93. Id. at 207.
94. Kennedy also testified on July 24, 25, 30, 31, August 1, 8, 23, and September 11, 1963.
See Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8.
95. Id. at 96.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 181 (statement of Sen. Phillip
Hart).
99. Id.
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States; it extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.100

Congressmen repeatedly challenged witnesses regarding the scope of the
Commerce Clause. In response to questions from Senator Thurmond, Marshall
also offered a broad test. Commerce, he said, “encompasses all matters that
affect the national economy, that involve more than one State.”101 Marshall
elaborated in the following exchange with Senator Winston Prouty:
Senator Prouty. By the standards you have set forth in your statement, is there
any form of commerce which does not have an impact or influence on
interstate commerce, and which is outside of the scope of congressional power
of regulation?
Mr. Marshall. Senator, I think Congress has the power under the commerce
clause to deal with any practice, any commercial practice, which is engaged in
any large numbers of businesses and which in a total sense affects the
economy and interstate commerce. And I think that power, in dealing with
that kind of a problem, gives Congress the power to deal, to regulate very
small businesses.
Senator Prouty. In effect the answer to my question then in “No”?
Mr. Marshall. Well, Senator, I think there has to be a substantive problem that
Congress is dealing with. I don’t think Congress can use the power of the
commerce clause to deal with a problem that has nothing to do with commerce
as such, that is it can’t use the power of the commerce clause to deal with
something totally unrelated to commercial realities of our national economy.102

The Administration argued that Congress could use the Commerce Clause
to regulate any activity that affected interstate commerce; there was no
requirement of a substantial effect.103 Although Marshall had told Senator
Prouty that Congress could regulate “any commercial practice,” in the same
exchange, he adopted the broader formulation which allowed Congress to
address activities related to “commercial realities of our national economy.”104
100. Id. at 155.
101. Id. at 239.
102. Id. at 216–17.
103. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 173 (testimony of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy); see also id. at 241 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at 771
(testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold) (citing United States v. Darby, which extended federal
power to intrastate activities which “so affect” interstate commerce); Civil Rights—President’s
Program, supra note 8, at 106 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (stating that court
decisions make it “quite clear” that the test is “affect interstate commerce”).
104. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 216–17; see also id. at 1183,
1190 (Brief of Prof. Paul A. Freund) (referring not only to Congress’s ability to regulate
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The Administration conceded that human dignity, not economic concerns,
motivated the legislation. That did not, however, counsel against invoking the
Commerce Clause. Senator Thurmond asked Kennedy rhetorically whether
the acts he cited “were primarily designed to regulate economic affairs of life
and that the basic purpose of this bill is to regulate moral and social affairs?”105
Kennedy replied:
Well, Senator, let me say this: I think that the discrimination that is taking
place at the present time is having a very adverse effect on our economy. So I
think that it is quite clear that under the commerce clause even if it was just on
that aspect and even if you get away from the moral aspect—I think it is quite
clear that this kind of discrimination has an adverse effect on the economy. I
think all you have to do is look at some of the southern communities at the
present time and the difficult time that they are having.106

The Administration meticulously laid out the case that discrimination
impacted interstate commerce. “Our whole economy suffers” from racial
discrimination, said Kennedy.107 Others expounded upon the effect of
discrimination on commerce.108 Under Secretary of Commerce Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jr. devoted his statement to “the adverse effect of racial
discrimination in public accommodations on interstate commerce.”109
Roosevelt reiterated the “effects” that Marshall had identified on July 8, 1963,
that focused on the way in which “segregation imposes unnatural limitations in
the conduct of business which are injurious to the free flow of commerce.”110
He also introduced a new theory regarding the effects of discrimination on
interstate commerce.
In essence, Roosevelt suggested that racial
discrimination gave rise to sit-ins, demonstrations, and boycotts, which
affected interstate commerce. He argued that “the current instability and
unrest swirling about various places of public accommodation from time to
time is directly injurious to interstate commerce.”111 Roosevelt devoted
“practices” substantially affecting commerce but also Congress’s ability to regulate “commercial
activities”).
105. Id. at 95.
106. Id.; see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 424 (Justice
Department Memorandum stating that Congress can reach conditions which “adversely affect”
allocation of resources).
107. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1374.
108. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 262 (comments of Sen.
Jacob Javits) (stating that discrimination reduces interstate travel); see also id. at 770–72
(comments of Dean Erwin Griswold). But see id. at 851–52 (comments of Sen. Strom
Thurmond) (denying any burden on commerce).
109. Id. at 689.
110. Id. at 691.
111. Id.; see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 216 (testimony of Atty.
Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (stating that the demonstrations have had “an extremely adverse effect
on interstate commerce”); id. at 424–25 (Justice Dep’t Mem.) (“Disputes involving the racially
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fourteen paragraphs of his statement to providing evidence of this
phenomenon.112
The Administration relied heavily on Wickard v. Filburn,113 a case it and
its allies cited often114 to demonstrate the broad scope of the commerce power.
When Thurmond suggested that refusal to serve an intrastate traveler was not a
burden on interstate commerce, Kennedy argued that “innumerable court
decisions” support the view that local or intrastate activities can affect
commerce because “we are talking about a cumulative situation,”115 a
reference he attributed to Wickard’s cumulative effects principle.116 Those
who opposed Title II criticized Wickard.117 When Dean Griswold indicated he
supported Wickard although it was “very close to the borderline,” Senator
Norris Cotton withdrew a comment he had just uttered that he wished
Griswold was on the Supreme Court.118
Opponents of the legislation complained that protection of commerce was
not its principal motive but simply “a convenient peg on which to hang this
particular hat.”119 The Commerce Clause addressed interstate business
transactions. It did not license the federal government to pursue a moral
vision. Moreover, they claimed the bill rested on a vision of the Commerce
Clause that would erase all limits on federal power. Governor Donald Russell
of South Carolina testified:
If this proposed legislation should be sustained, there is no activity of our
citizens which may not be subjected to direct control by Federal legislation,

discriminatory practices of places of public accommodation give rise to picketing and other
demonstrations. The picketing and the demonstrations interfere with the sale of goods and thus
affect interstate commerce in precisely the same manner as would labor disputes involving such
establishments.”).
112. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 699–700.
113. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
114. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 80, 86 (testimony of
Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 181 (comments of Sen. Philip A. Hart); id. at 775
(testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold); see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8,
at 216, 223 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 422 (Justice Dep’t Mem.); Civil
Rights, supra note 41, at 1420 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 1885
(testimony of Joseph Rauh).
115. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 105; see Civil Rights—
President’s Program, supra note 8, at 193 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy).
116. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 106; see also id. at 190
(comments of Sen. John Sherman Cooper) (“It can regulate even intrastate commerce where a
single transaction does not substantially affect interstate commerce, but where the accumulation
of like transactions throughout the country would substantially affect interstate commerce.”); id.
at 210 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall).
117. See, e.g., Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 220 (statement of Sen.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.).
118. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 776.
119. Id. at 919 (testimony of Fla. Gov. Farris Bryant).
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and no individual who may not be directly dealt with in relation to any and all
of his affairs. Congress would no longer have to find its authority in any other
part of the Constitution; the commerce clause would authorize anything it
might choose to do. Such, we submit, is not our constitutional system.120

The vision behind the Administration’s bill would leave no role for states,121
opponents such as Thurmond and others claimed. Representative Joe D.
Waggoner, Jr. put the argument most forcefully: “To concede such power to
the Federal Government is to relegate State and local government to the ashcan
of history and reduce city halls and State capitols to nothing more than
concrete monuments to a system of government we once enjoyed.”122 Senator
Sam Ervin particularly worried over the suggestion that Congress could
regulate discrimination at restaurants that served food which had moved in
interstate commerce. Such a theory would lead to a parade of horribles as
Congress could regulate marriage (“because the groom gives the bride a ring
that has moved in interstate commerce”), birth “and all that precedes birth”
(“because babies stimulate interstate commerce by using safety pins and
diapers, which have moved in interstate commerce”) and death (“because
corpses are buried in coffins and caskets which have moved in interstate
commerce”).123 Similarly, Ervin thought allowing the commerce power to
reach activities of travelers would expand federal power. “Congress could get
some people traveling in interstate commerce to go around and deal with
everybody. Then Congress could regulate everything,” he predicted.124
Others echoed some of Ervin’s concerns regarding the implications of the
Administration’s theory for federal constitutional power. Senator Mike
Monroney, for instance, worried that the Commerce Clause might authorize
legislation “in almost every walk of life. . . . [W]here is the stopping place?
Where is the cutoff?”125 Monroney did not think the Commerce Clause should
“take in every hamburger stand and every 10-room motel and every guesthouse
and things of that kind.”126 He feared that the Commerce Clause “would put
every single line of business that a man can imagine under Federal control
from now on, not just on bias or prejudice but on anything else the

120. Id. at 885.
121. See id. at 176 (comments of Sen. Strom Thurmond); see also id. at 367 (testimony of
Miss. Gov. Ross R. Barnett).
122. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1733.
123. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 37; see also id. at 232, 236.
124. Id. at 194.
125. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 154; see also id. at 417 (stating
concern about stretching the Constitution by use of the Commerce Clause); id. at 446 (raising “a
number of constitutional objections” to the Commerce Clause rationale); id. at 800 (stating that a
number of committee members were concerned about expansion of the Commerce Clause); id. at
801 (concurring regarding boundaries on the Commerce Clause).
126. Id. at 921.
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Government would choose to go and do, whether it be licensing or price
control or otherwise.”127 The Commerce Clause should not apply to “purely
local matters.”128 Although Southerners were most vocal in raising federalism
arguments, Northern Republicans voiced similar concerns, though in
somewhat more restrained language.129
The Administration dismissed the notion of an infinite Commerce Clause.
“Of course, there are limits on congressional power under the commerce
clause,” said a Justice Department Memorandum Robert Kennedy submitted
on August 9, 1963.130 Congress did not “hold the power to regulate all of a
man’s conduct solely because he has [a] relationship with interstate
commerce.”131 Congress could only regulate if there was “a relationship
between interstate commerce and the evil to be regulated.”132 Similarly,
Professor Paul A. Freund rejected the argument that the Administration’s
approach would “obliterate the limits” on Commerce Clause power.133 There
must be “a functional relationship between the facilities of interstate commerce
and the abuse or evil” targeted.134
The opponents’ complaint rested on an archaic view of federalism that
conceived federal and state governments as acting in distinct, rather than
overlapping spheres. Marshall suggested that the states were not rendered
powerless even though no “clear-cut division” separated federal and state
domains.135 He said:
I think that the States have a reservoir of power that goes beyond simply and
purely intrastate commerce, and that they can regulate matters that affect
interstate commerce, just like the Federal Government can, in its turn, regulate
matters that affect intrastate commerce, when that is necessary to effective
regulation of interstate commerce, which is appropriate.136

Moreover, absent a conflict or federal preemption, Kennedy argued that states
would retain vast regulatory authority, particularly because the proposed
legislation contained a non-preemption clause.137 Of course, the Southerners’
127. Id. at 922.
128. Id. at 1119 (comments of Sen. Mike Monroney); see also Civil Rights—President’s
Program, supra note 8, at 192 (comments of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.) (Congress cannot reach
“local activities”); Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1732 (testimony of Rep. Joe D. Waggoner, Jr.)
(Commerce Clause “carried to arbitrary extremes that were never contemplated by the Nation’s
founders”).
129. See, e.g., Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1606 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay).
130. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 422.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1185.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 240.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 176–77 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy).
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problem was that the Jim Crow state legislation they would have preferred
would have conflicted with the entire premise of Title II.
Finally, some challenged the Commerce Clause rationale on the grounds
that it violated the text of the Clause or exceeded the bounds of judicial
doctrine. Senator Sam Ervin articulated perhaps the most comprehensive
critique of Title II. He argued that Congress could not require hotels, motels,
or other places of public accommodation to serve those traveling in interstate
commerce because their travel was interrupted when they stopped to sleep.138
Ervin criticized Title II as an effort:
to regulate the use of privately owned property and personal activities within
the borders of a State after interstate commerce has ceased merely because the
persons using such privately owned property or rendering such personal
services may use some goods which at some time in the past have moved in
interstate commerce or may serve some travelers who have journeyed in time
past from one State to another.139

Ervin interpreted the Commerce Clause to authorize Congress to regulate “the
movement of persons, goods, or information from one State to another” and to
reach intrastate activities only to the extent “necessary or appropriate to its
effective execution” of its power to regulate interstate movement.140 Ervin
distinguished three acts the Court had upheld: the Fair Labor Standards Act,
National Labor Relations Act, and the Agriculture Adjustment Act. They
regulated activities “relating to future shipments in interstate commerce[,]” not
“the use of privately owned property and personal activities within the borders
of States under the commerce clause after all possible interstate commerce has
ended.”141 Similarly, Representative Richard Poff argued that neither
Congress nor the Court had previously “regulate[d] service establishments
under the interstate commerce clause or . . . establish[ed] what might be called
a requirement to serve.”142
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment

The Kennedy Administration did the heavy lifting with respect to the
Commerce Clause with support from sympathetic legislators. Legislators,
however, largely developed the constitutional argument for relying on the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Administration provided some help in that
respect, but it also offered critiques.
The case for using the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis of the act rested
in large part on the fact that the same general purpose animated that
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 31, 36.
Id. at 213; see also id. at 207–08.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 215.
Rules Committee, supra note 8, at 372–73.
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constitutional text and the proposed legislation. Both were conceived to
address racial inequality. As Senator John Sherman Cooper argued:
I do not suppose that anyone would seriously contend that the administration is
proposing legislation, or the Congress is considering legislation, because it has
been suddenly determined, after all these years, that segregation is a burden on
interstate commerce. We are considering legislation because we believe, as
the great majority of the people in our country believe, that all citizens have an
equal right to have access to goods, services, and facilities which are held out
to be available for public use and patronage.143

Some argued that the Fourteenth Amendment approach would avoid
problems inherent in the Commerce Clause.144 Proponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment approach argued that it would reach a broader array of businesses.
Under prevailing doctrine, the Commerce Clause would apply only to acts that
affected commerce. Legislation based on the Commerce Clause would tolerate
discrimination in public accommodations that did not affect interstate
commerce.145 Some intrastate discrimination would theoretically escape
regulation.
The Fourteenth Amendment approach would be able to prohibit all
Although the Fourteenth
discrimination without regard to degree.146
Amendment approach hardly thrilled die-hards who sought to preserve
segregated public places, it was more palatable to some who worried that the
Commerce Clause distorted federalism. Senator John Sherman Cooper argued
that the interstate commerce clause had traditionally been used to break down
state lines and relieve states of responsibilities, whereas the Fourteenth
Amendment was used to hold states to their responsibilities and give them
incentive “to adhere to the law.”147 And Senator Mike Monroney argued:
Many of us, I think, are disturbed that this will set a precedent which could
ultimately result in the Federal Government licensing all types of business by
making the commerce clause apply to matters far removed from bias or
discrimination. If reliance were placed on the 14th amendment, it would be
aimed strictly at bias and discrimination and would not enlarge upon the vast
powers that would affect other types of commerce and change our whole
pattern of State regulation for intrastate business contrary to the true concept of
goods moving in interstate commerce.148

143. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 190.
144. See id. at 57 (comments of Sen. Norris Cotton).
145. Id. at 190 (comments of Sen. John Sherman Cooper).
146. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1604–05 (comments of Reps. John V. Lindsay & William
H. McCulloch).
147. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 194; see also Civil Rights, supra
note 41, at 1603 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay).
148. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 220; see also id. at 804–05, 807
(comments of Sen. Mike Monroney).
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Indeed, Monroney was so intent on avoiding the Commerce Clause that he
repeatedly suggested a constitutional amendment to clarify the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate the state action requirement.149 A chorus of others
joined Monroney’s proposal.150 Of course, that approach would have delayed
any legislative solution for years.
Clearly, the Fourteenth Amendment approach faced several obstacles. The
Civil Rights Cases required state action as a prerequisite to a violation under
the Fourteenth Amendment or legislation pursuant to it. It had struck down
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the grounds that section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment limited Congress to addressing state action to enforce
its provisions. Congress could not address discrimination that private choice
produced. The state action doctrine had eroded as the Court had flexed it to
apply the Equal Protection Clause to some private activity.151 Yet the doctrine
was not defunct. The “sit-in” cases during the 1962 term had found some
relatively conventional form of state action through legislative or executive
action.152 The Court did not hold that the Equal Protection Clause required a
private entrepreneur to serve people of all races. Only Justice Douglas
endorsed that proposition.153
Still, in 1963 the decision in The Civil Rights Cases was not quite the
impediment it had once seemed. Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold argued that
“much of the force of that decision ha[d] diminished and the premises on
which it was based ha[d] been undermined.”154 The Court had more recently
recognized an expanded concept of state action.155 States regulated businesses
to a far greater extent in 1963 than was true four score years earlier.156
Beginning in the 1930s, courts had permitted regulation of private property
devoted to a public interest to a much greater degree than was true in 1883.157

149. See, e.g., id. at 220.
150. See, e.g., id. at 789–90 (comments of Sen. Clair Engle) (proposing constitutional
amendment of Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate state action requirement); id. at 802
(comments of Sen. Mike Monroney); id. at 970–71 (comments of Sen. Norris Cotton and Gov.
Carl E. Sanders).
151. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
152. See supra notes 27–37 and accompanying text.
153. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“When the
doors of a business are open to the public, they must be open to all regardless of race if apartheid
is not to become engrained in our public places.”).
154. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 772.
155. Id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)); see also Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1876 (testimony of Joseph
Rauh).
156. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 230–31 (statements of Asst.
Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold).
157. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1876 (testimony of Joseph Rauh).
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The Civil Rights Cases were “a shell that is only waiting for its obituary
notice.”158
Alternatively, others thought The Civil Rights Cases could be
distinguished. Three theories were offered. The Court had decided the case
before the proliferation of Jim Crow laws.159 State laws since 1883 had
encouraged some of the discrimination that subsequently occurred and the
practices that remained in force.160 In some areas, “customs having the force
of law have operated to establish a uniform community policy of segregation
in public places.”161 Thus, discrimination might be traceable to state action.
Moreover, police, executive, and judicial action often enforced private
discriminatory practices.162 An extension of Shelley v. Kraemer163 might find
state action here as well. Finally, some argued that state licensing of
businesses might provide the required state action.
The “public
accommodations” bill, S. 1591, which Senators John Sherman Cooper and
Thomas Dodd introduced, rested on this concept. Senator Cooper argued:
The point I make is that the bill which Senator Dodd and I have introduced is
based on the premise that in the licensing of a business which is held out to the
public, the State has manifested its interest significantly and in such a way as
to bring discrimination in such private businesses under the prohibition of the
14th amendment. When a State licenses, it has then the power to enforce
safety regulations, health and sanitation regulations, fire regulations, and all
other police power regulations, and thereby asserts the public interest. I would
go further and say that when it gives a license to a company or private business
which holds itself out to public use, it confers upon that business the
opportunity to discriminate. I believe that it would be found that a business
which is licensed and which is held out to the public comes within the purview
of the 14th amendment.164

Representative John V. Lindsay thought Congress could reach, under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, any places of accommodation the
state “authorized” or “regulated” that were open to the public,165 an approach
similar to,166 yet broader than,167 the Cooper–Dodd measure. Representative

158. Id. at 1877.
159. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
160. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 224 (testimony of Asst. Atty.
Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold).
161. Id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold).
162. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1376 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy).
163. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
164. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 192.
165. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1608–10.
166. See id. at 1416 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay).
167. Id. at 2262–64 (testimony of Rep. Clark MacGregor).
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Lindsay argued that Congress should pass broad legislation predicated on his
authority-to-do-business approach and test each case through the courts.168
All were not convinced that state licensing was tantamount to state action.
Licensing, they said, was a neutral way to further private enterprise that did not
Robert Kennedy
involve state operation or state endorsement.169
acknowledged that “a very strong argument” could be made that licensing was
not state action.170 Justice Douglas had endorsed the idea that licensing was a
mode of state action in his Lombard concurrence,171 but no other justice had
joined his opinion. Professor Herbert Wechsler, a leading constitutional
scholar, ridiculed the argument. He wrote:
One need not be a lawyer to perceive that the fact that a State requires a
lunchroom to obtain a license as a means of protecting the public health does
not make the lunchroom a State agency. Are all private corporations to be
viewed as organs of the State because their corporate existence is conferred by
their State charters? It puts the matter with excessive charity to say that this is
a submission which is most unlikely to persuade the Supreme Court and, what
is more important, should not do so. In the entire history of the judicial
interpretation of the 14th amendment, only Justice Douglas has accorded the
position color of support in an opinion.172

Moreover, the Cooper–Dodd licensing approach posed dangers of its own.
Some businesses might escape coverage if they were not licensed.173
Licensing requirements varied state to state. Department stores, supermarkets,
bowling alleys, and amusement parks would be covered in some states but not
others.174 Because different states licensed different activities, such a law
would not apply uniformly.175 The licensing approach would also have
constitutional impacts beyond the field of racial discrimination. If the Court
adopted the licensing approach as state action, Senator Hart suggested that any
licensed business activity would be imputed to the states.176 Such an approach,
Marshall said, “might have a very, very far-reaching effect on what business

168. Id. at 1395.
169. See, e.g., Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 41–42 (comments of Sen.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.).
170. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1419.
171. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282–83 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (licensing
makes a restaurant an instrumentality of the State).
172. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 309; see also id. at 270 (letter of
Prof. Paul G. Kauper); id. at 275 (letter of Prof. Arthur E. Sutherland); id. at 1188 (Brief of Prof.
Paul A. Freund).
173. Id. at 253 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall).
174. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 41, at 428 (Justice Dep’t Mem.).
175. Id. at 96–97 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy).
176. Id. at 224.
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establishments could and could not do.”177 For instance, efforts to limit speech
in department stores might raise First Amendment issues.178
Some worried that relying on some theory of state action might play into
the hands of segregation’s supporters. Kennedy worried that states might
circumvent legislation based on the Fourteenth Amendment “by removing all
State action.”179 If the state action were discriminatory legislation, it might
eliminate it from the books. If it were licensing requirements, it might
“remove the licensing requirement.”180 Not all viewed these contingencies as
likely. Senator Cooper thought it “absolutely foolish” to think states would
abandon their licensing powers; if they did, he doubted the Court would allow
them “to escape or avoid the law.”181
Kennedy thought relying exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment would
assume “an extra burden”182 because the Court had declared similar legislation
unconstitutional eighty years earlier in The Civil Rights Cases.183 Although the
Administration relied principally on the Commerce Clause, it did not totally
disregard the Fourteenth Amendment as a possible source of legislative
power.184
As the various hearings progressed, however, Kennedy’s enthusiasm for
the Fourteenth Amendment approach cooled. Initially, Kennedy thought the
Fourteenth Amendment provided an alternative basis for the legislation.
Though controversial, he thought the Court would recognize it.185 By the time
he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18, 1963, he was
less positive. Kennedy believed that relying solely on the Fourteenth
Amendment would raise “very far-reaching and grave issues.”186 Finding state
action in private businesses because they were licensed “would impose on the
legislation very heavy burdens which it need not carry.”187 The Court would
need to overturn The Civil Rights Cases, an action that “would have vast

177. Id.
178. Id.; see also id. at 247 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall).
179. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 167; see also Civil Rights—
President’s Program, supra note 8, at 428 (Justice Dep’t Mem.).
180. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 167 (statement of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy); see also Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1881 (comments of Rep. James C.
Corman); Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1188 (Brief of Prof. Paul A.
Freund).
181. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 193.
182. Id. at 28.
183. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
184. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 74 (testimony of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy).
185. Id. at 28, 132–33, 166–67.
186. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 96.
187. Id.
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constitutional implications” and pose considerable practical difficulties.188
Still, the Fourteenth Amendment might provide support to the extent Title II
addressed state legislative, executive, or judicial action promoting
discrimination.189
By July 24, 1963, Kennedy essentially rejected the licensing theory by
itself, agreeing that his views on that subject paralleled Ervin’s.190 The Justice
Department thought it doubtful that the state was responsible for every person
it licensed. Licenses were issued to produce revenue or to maintain health or
safety standards, not to transform private actors into public bodies. “[T]reating
licensees as State agencies would raise substantial and troublesome questions
as to the applicability of other 14th amendment inhibitions, such as the due
process clause, to establishments heretofore regarded as generally immune
from such strictures.”191 The Administration’s narrower approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment stressed the argument that Congress could remedy the
effects of state-created discrimination.192 State action might be found in state
Jim Crow laws or “encouragement and fostering and toleration” of such
practices.193 The effects of the Jim Crow laws continued to be felt, justifying
use of the Fourteenth Amendment as an additional basis.194 The Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to “sweep away” state legislative, executive,
and judicial action “promoting discrimination.”195 This approach avoided the
broad implications of the licensing approach, yet might prove vulnerable where
segregation traced to private preference,196 an increasingly common
phenomenon since the Court had invalidated state discriminatory laws.
The Administration argued that the Fourteenth Amendment approach
would complicate passage197 because The Civil Rights Cases constituted an
adverse precedent that would afford opponents a constitutional argument to
advance.198 Republicans initially insisted the contrary was true. The
Commerce Clause would encounter resistance because it would present the
spectre of a more encompassing federal role.199 Some Republicans, however,
188. Id.
189. Id. at 96–97.
190. See id. at 153.
191. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 426 (Justice Dep’t Mem.).
192. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 250 (statements of Asst. Atty.
Gen. Burke Marshall).
193. Id. at 248 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall).
194. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 166–67, 183, 186 (testimony of
Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy).
195. Id. at 96.
196. Id. at 251, 253 (statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall).
197. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1395–96, 1414–15 (statements of Atty. Gen. Robert F.
Kennedy).
198. Id. at 1416.
199. Id. at 2271–72 (statement of Rep. Clark MacGregor).
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suggested that “a combination of some kind” that relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause might be the price of their
support.200
C. Additional Supports
Congressional hearings also served as a forum to float two additional,
rather novel, theories to support Title II. Kennedy also raised the Thirteenth
Amendment as a possible constitutional basis for Title II. Indeed, he said it
might provide a stronger foundation than the Fourteenth because it did not
require state action.201 Kennedy suggested that “all of this effort to keep the
Negro from obtaining really a decent and reasonable life in the United States—
it is all part of a system.”202 The Thirteenth Amendment empowered
Congress, said Marshall, to address “the remaining badges left over from the
previous condition of servitude.”203 Title II addressed a “vestige of slavery.”
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment was a source of legislative power.204
The argument had a certain appeal. Jim Crow laws may not have been
slavery’s immediate successors, but they certainly were badges of second-class
status that the Thirteenth Amendment addressed in the private sphere. Indeed,
a few years later, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, the Court held that the
Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to outlaw private discrimination
in the sale of real estate.205 Congress could determine “the badges and
incidents of slavery” and act to redress them.206 Yet The Civil Rights Cases
had rejected the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for the Civil Rights Act of
1875. Accordingly, some of the same problems that disqualified the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to it.
The Citizenship Clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provided yet another possible basis for the legislation. Republican Senator
Winston L. Prouty suggested it, no doubt as a way to avoid relying on the
Commerce Clause or encountering the state action obstacle. Dean Griswold,
though confessing to having never considered the clause as authority for Title

200. See, e.g., id. at 1415 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay).
201. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 74.
202. Id at 118; see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 152 (relating
treatment of Negro as “inferior” to slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment); id. at 164–
65 (stating that Negro’s were treated as second-class citizens).
203. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 231–32; see also Civil Rights,
supra note 41, at 1607 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay); Civil Rights—President’s Program,
supra note 8, at 429 (Justice Dep’t Mem.).
204. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 776, 787, 793 (testimony of
Dean Erwin Griswold); see also id. at 798 (statement of Sen. Winston L. Prouty read by Sen.
Thurston Morton).
205. 392 U.S. 409, 438–39 (1968).
206. Id. at 440.
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II, conceded that “the more I think of it, in the few seconds since you first
suggested it, the more potentialities it seems to me to have.”207 The Prouty–
Griswold interpretation expanded the conventional meaning of the Citizenship
Clause. The Clause was designed to reverse the infamous Dred Scott decision;
it had not been used as a basis to grant equal rights to African-Americans. The
Equal Protection Clause seemed a more natural means to achieve that end. Yet
Senator Prouty’s impulse, that citizenship should confer a right not to be
denied service based on race, had intuitive appeal. Indeed, eminent scholars
have recently suggested the Clause would have provided an appealing basis to
support the Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe208 that Congress could not
create racially separate schools in the District of Columbia.209 In 1963,
however, it appeared a less developed theory than the Commerce Clause or
Fourteenth Amendment.
D. The Private Property Argument
Opponents of the public accommodations provisions attacked such
governmental regulation as an infringement of private property rights protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.210 For instance, Governor
Ross Barnett of Mississippi testified:
The right to do business or to decline to do business with any individual is an
inseparable part of said citizen’s right to operate and control his privately
owned business. If this right is destroyed by the Federal Government, the
citizen has been deprived of one of his inalienable rights just as surely as
though the Federal Government had confiscated his physical personal
property.211

Governor George Wallace thought proposed Title II “would strike the death
knell of the private property ownership in this country.”212 Governor Farris
Bryant argued that the Ninth Amendment protected the freedom to own

207. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 791; see also id. at 796
(statement of Dean Erwin Griswold); id. at 798 (statement of Sen. Winston L. Prouty).
208. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
209. See Professor Drew S. Days, III, Revised Opinions in Brown v. Board of Education:
Drew S. Days (concurring), in JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID (2001) 92, 97–98.
210. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 160, 423, 426
(comments of Sen. Strom Thurmond); id. at 392 (statements of Gov. Ross R. Barnett).
211. Id. at 363.
212. Id. at 493; see also id. at 755–56 (comments of Sen. Strom Thurmond); id. at 919
(comments of Gov. Farris Bryant); id. at 964 (comments of Gov. Carl E. Sanders); id. at 976–77
(comments of Sen. Thurmond and Gov. Carl E. Sanders); Civil Rights—President’s Program,
supra note 8, at 42 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.) (stating that the legislation would end the
right to own personal property); Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1713 (comments of Rep. Albert
Watson).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1122

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1095

property.213 Strom Thurmond castigated Title II as an uncompensated
taking.214
These notions of private property, preposterous as they now seem, and
extreme even when voiced, were not in 1963 totally implausible. During the
Court’s conference on the “sit-in” cases on November 9, 1962, several Justices
expressed views sympathetic to the right of a private restaurant to exclude
persons based on race.215 One year later, when the Court considered a second
set of sit-in cases in October 1963, the picture was not much different.
Although some of the cases might contain sufficient hints of police or
legislative action to constitute plausible cases of state action,216 Bell v.
Maryland217 presented the issue squarely. Whereas Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Douglas and Brennan were prepared to hold that places of public
accommodations, unlike homes, could not exclude persons based on race,
Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White thought the Constitution did
not bar private entrepreneurs from so doing because their conduct was not state
action.218
Nonetheless, the Justices’ argument regarding private property was
significantly different from the one Barnett and others urged. While some of
these Justices did not think the Constitution itself precluded discrimination in
places of public accommodations, they also did not think the Constitution
precluded Congress from banning it. Thus, Justice Black thought “Congress
can pass a law making it a duty for a storekeeper to sell to all comers,”219 a
position many of his colleagues apparently shared.220
The argument the Southerner politicians raised was essentially a
“smokescreen.”221 It gave private property an inviolability that would preclude
commonly accepted forms of governmental regulation. Congress typically
regulated use of private property that was reasonably related to a problem
within its power to address.222 Some thirty-two states had enacted laws
213. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 920, 923–24.
214. Id. at 493.
215. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 38, at 712–13
(Black, J.); id. at 714 (Clark, J.); id. at 714–15 (Harlan, J.); id. at 715–16 (Stewart, J.).
216. Id. at 718–19 (Warren, C.J.) (recommending disposition of cases).
217. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
218. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 38, at 717–23.
219. Id. at 720.
220. Id. at 717–23.
221. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 22 (statement of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy).
222. See John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job
Opportunities (June 19, 1963), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, JAN. 1–NOV. 22, 1963, at 485 (1964); see also Civil Rights—Public
Accommodations, supra note 5, at 245 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at
264–65 (comments of Sen. Jacob Javits,); id. at 773, 775 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold).
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outlawing discrimination in private businesses.223
Moreover, concerns
regarding the sanctity of private property had not stopped Southern states from
adopting Jim Crow laws forbidding entrepreneurs from serving blacks. If
private property owners’ rights were not offended by laws forbidding service,
why would they be breached by laws requiring service? As Robert F.
Kennedy put it, “[s]urely it is no greater an infringement to compel
nondiscrimination than it has been to compel discrimination.”224
When challenged with the incongruity in his position, Governor George
Wallace recast the issue as involving an assault on federalism, not on private
property. “That is what we are saying, let the States handle this matter. . . .”225
Local officials, unlike Washington bureaucrats, were accessible to aggrieved
citizens.226 Regardless of the merits of the federalism argument, the retreat
exposed a weakness in the Southern position. They championed the sanctity of
private property only when Washington was the regulator. They were happy to
allow local government to regulate away. As such, the private property
argument collapsed into one about federalism or about the propriety of
segregation.
E.

The Briefs

In addition to the oral testimony regarding constitutional issues, Congress
received written submissions discussing those issues from a range of interested
parties—scholars, political leaders, citizens.
Two were particularly
noteworthy—a brief by Professor Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law School and
one the Justice Department submitted on August 9, 1963, to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Freund brief had some impact.227
Freund enjoyed uncommon stature in American legal circles. The New York

223. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 94–95 (testimony of Atty. Gen.
Robert F. Kennedy).
224. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 21, 160; see also id. at 264–65
(comments of Sen. Jacob Javits); id. at 268 (letter of Prof. Edmond Cahn and Prof. Robert B.
McKay); id. at 269 (letter of Prof. Norman Dorsen); id. at 270 (letter of Prof. Paul Freund); Civil
Rights, supra note 41, at 1376 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy). Indeed,
conservative journalist James Kirkpatrick, who opposed the Civil Rights Act, conceded that the
Jim Crow laws were unconstitutional on this basis. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra
note 5, at 427–28.
225. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 516.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE
HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 25 (2001) (finding Freund’s brief effective in
persuading Republicans).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1124

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1095

Times described him as “a revered figure in the constitutional law field”228 in
quoting his opinion; Senators gushed about him.229
Freund argued that the Commerce Clause was “clearly adequate and
appropriate” to support Title II.230 Congress had frequently used it to regulate
local practices that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.231 In regulating
such activities, the aggregate effect of all similar practices on a national scale,
not just those of the establishment being regulated, were counted.232 The fact
that Congress’s real motive was to redress a moral wrong did not render the
Commerce Clause irrelevant. “Where social injustices occur in commercial
activities[,] the commerce power is a natural and familiar means for dealing
with them,” he wrote.233
Freund also cautioned against relying on the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Civil Rights Cases presented an impediment. The difficulty, Freund said, was
that “to state the principle that would underlie an overruling is far from
easy.”234 Overruling The Civil Rights Cases would “have a momentum of
principle that might carry it far beyond the issues of racial discrimination or
public accommodations.”235 Whereas Congress could determine how much of
its Commerce Clause power to use on a case-by-case basis, overruling The
Civil Rights Cases might expand rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in
ways not anticipated.236
The Justice Department memorandum also argued that Congress clearly
had power under the Commerce Clause to pass Title II.237 Relying on the
Fourteenth Amendment alone was more treacherous. Congress need not
choose between the two theories.238 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress
could regulate local activities and moral wrongs that affected interstate
commerce alone or when aggregated with other such activities. Title II
addressed the sort of effects Commerce Clause legislation often targeted—
artificial restraints on markets, restrictions on travel, conditions that adversely

228. Anthony Lewis, Issue in Rights Debate: Reliance on 14th Amendment or Commerce
Clause in Public Accommodations Section is Examined, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1963, at 4E.
229. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 265 (comments of Sen.
Jacob Javits, referring to Freund as law professor “of very great respect”); (comments of Sen.
Warren Magnuson calling Freund “one of the outstanding authorities in this field”).
230. Id. at 1190.
231. Id. at 1183.
232. Id. at 1184.
233. Id. at 1190.
234. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1187.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1295.
238. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 421 (Justice Dep’t Mem.).
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affect allocations of resources, demonstrations and protests which interfere
with commerce.239
The Justice Department, like Freund, viewed The Civil Rights Cases as a
formidable obstacle to the Fourteenth Amendment theory.240 To sustain Title
II based solely on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would need to
overrule or distinguish that precedent. The Justice Department did not think
the licensing theory likely to succeed, nor was it optimistic that a coherent
theory could simply address businesses affected with a public interest.241 The
Justice Department thought a more promising theory would begin from the
premise that public segregation was “the product of and supported by State
action.”242 In remedying such practices, Congress was not confined to address
only the actions of state officials. To end state support for discrimination, it
could go beyond the substantive prohibitions of the Equal Protection Clause to
outlaw discrimination itself.243 Section 5, like the Necessary and Proper
Clause, allowed Congress to use reasonable means to achieve constitutional
ends.244 Still, the questions and controversy regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment, juxtaposed with the certain applicability of the Commerce
Clause, compelled reliance on both.
F.

The Committees

Congressional committees had little trouble finding that the proposed
legislation was constitutional. Although the Senate Judiciary Committee never
acted on the proposed legislation, the Commerce Committee reported S.
1732.245 It concluded that The Civil Rights Cases were not an impediment to
passage of Title II. The 1875 law rested on section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. A “large body of legal thought”
believed the present Court would reverse its 1883 decision or that “changed
circumstances” would suggest a distinction.246 Ultimately, the merits of that
debate were irrelevant because S. 1732, unlike the 1875 act, rested on the
Commerce Clause, not section 5. The Commerce Committee attached and
relied upon Professor Freund’s analysis. It quoted his conclusion that “[t]he

239. Id. at 422–25.
240. Id. at 425; see also Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1299.
241. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 426; Civil Rights—Public
Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1300.
242. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 425–26; Civil Rights—Public
Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1299–1300.
243. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 425; Civil Rights—Public
Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1299.
244. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 426; Civil Rights—Public
Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1299–1300.
245. See generally S. REP. NO. 88-872 (1964).
246. Id. at 12.
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commerce power is clearly adequate and appropriate. . . . No impropriety need
be felt in using the Commerce Clause as a response to a deep moral
concern.”247 Congress could “regulate commerce or that which affects it for
other than purely economic goals,” the Committee concluded.248
The Committee thought the legislation necessary primarily to address the
deprivation of human dignity segregation caused. The measure also addressed
“economic burdens created by discrimination in public establishments.”249
The Committee thought this nation’s economy suffered “when the
discriminatory practices employed by such establishments lead to
demonstrations or boycotts.”250 This effect on commerce was the first, but not
the only, one the Committee cited. The Committee also found that
discrimination reduced convention business and decreased travel, that industry
was reluctant to locate in segregated areas, and that professional life was
discouraged.251
Three Committee members appended their individual views to the report,
and each emphasized constitutional issues. Senator Monroney favored civil
rights legislation, including a public accommodations provision. He thought S.
1732 went beyond constitutional limits in regulating “purely local matters.”252
The clause should be limited to regulating interstate travellers and interstate
businesses to avoid compromising “our dual system of government.”253
Senator Strom Thurmond also emphasized federalism issues, which he
mislabelled “separation of powers.” The Tenth Amendment, he said, was
intended to preserve “the separation of powers doctrine.”254 The Tenth
Amendment “was intended to be a bulwark against the eroding effects of the
passage of time, faulty memories and an ever-grasping Central
Government.”255 The legislation was not authorized by the Fourteenth
Amendment due to the absence of state action, by the Thirteenth Amendment
because segregation was not slavery, or by the Commerce Clause because it
was not intended to allow regulation of “the use of purely private property at
rest within the confines of any particular State.”256 Moreover, S. 1732
interfered with private property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment.257

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 13 (quoting Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1190).
S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17–20.
Id. at 40.
S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 62–65.
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Finally, Senator Norris Cotton thought S. 1732 distorted the Commerce
Clause “dangerously” and expanded it “enormously.”258 A constitutional
amendment was needed to address racial discrimination. In the meantime, he
would limit legislation to banning segregation in publicly owned
establishments and based on state or local law.
The House Committee on the Judiciary reported the full bill (H.R.
It limited its constitutional discussion to some conclusory
7152).259
statements. A few members, however, raised constitutional concerns in their
individual comments. Representative George Meader, for instance, thought
H.R. 7152, as well as the Administration’s bill, stretched the Commerce Clause
and Equal Protection Clause.260 Because the Court would not enforce
constitutional limits, Congress must.261
A minority report for six
representatives claimed Title II violated the Fifth and Tenth Amendments and
found no support from the Commerce Clause or the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments.262 Representative William McCulloch, for himself and six
Republican colleagues, presented a supplemental report defending H.R. 7152
on the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.263 Congress had ample
power to remove burdens on the free flow of commerce.264 The Republicans
relied on Wickard and other precedents for showing the breadth of the
clause.265 There was ample evidence that discrimination had an “adverse
effect” on commerce—travel was impeded, business discouraged, and
demonstrations had a chilling impact.266
G. The Floor Debates
Constitutional issues relating to Title II did not command so great a
percentage of the floor discussion in the House and Senate as they had in
earlier stages. Several factors account for this change. Both bodies addressed
the entire legislation, not simply Title II, so attention was divided; previously
the Senate Commerce Committee at least had addressed only Title II. The
debate between the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment had been
258. S. REP. NO. 88-872 at 78.
259. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963).
260. Id. at 50–52.
261. Id. at 51–52.
262. Id. at 91–94.
263. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (Part 2) at 1–32 (1963).
264. Id. at 13.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 7–15. The House Committee on Rules held nine days of public hearings on H.R.
7152 in January 1964. The Committee was chaired by Representative Howard W. Smith, an
ardent segregationist. Other than a few proponents of the bill, most testifying were foes, many of
whom raised constitutional objections. See generally Rules Committee, supra note 8. For an
excellent account of strategic issues, see CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 85–100 (1985).
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resolved and so was no longer pertinent. Much floor time in the Senate related
to procedural matters and to the Southerners’ filibuster. Although some of the
latter related to the Constitution, it was rambling and not particularly germane
to Title II. Finally, many legislators were talking to their electorates and,
accordingly, esoteric discussions of the Commerce Clause may have seemed
unappealing.
Yet constitutional issues were not ignored during floor debates. The
discussion followed the lines of committee hearings. In the House, proponents
made general assertions of the constitutionality of Title II.267 Opponents were
more expressive in raising constitutional issues as a reason to oppose the
legislation. Representative Edwin E. Willis condemned Title II for going
beyond prior Court rulings.268 Title II improperly regulated “intrastate”
commerce while destroying property rights that the Constitution protects.269
The legislation violated the text of the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection
Clause and ignored prevailing precedent, namely The Civil Rights Cases.270
Others thought Title II would “destroy” the Constitution.271 To Representative
Arthur Winstead, Title II was “the most glaringly unconstitutional piece of
legislation ever introduced in the Congress.”272 Representative Richard Poff
thought the Commerce Clause had been “distorted by expansion.”273
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democratic floor leader for the bill,
provided the most significant discussion of constitutional issues relating to

267. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1512 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Madden) (Title II “clearly
consistent” with Constitution); id. at 1522–26 (remarks of Rep. Celler) (Title II constitutional); id.
at 1529 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1540 (comments of Rep.
Lindsay) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1592 (remarks of Rep. MacGregor) (Title II
constitutional); id. at 1592 (remarks of Rep. Corman) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1593
(Remarks of Rep. Farbstein) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1594 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer) (Title II
constitutional under Equal Protection Clause); id. at 1599 (remarks of Rep. Minish) (Title II
constitutional under Commerce Clause); id. at 1600 (Remarks of Rep. Daniels) (Title II
constitutional); id. at 1602 (remarks of Rep. Mathias) (Title II constitutional under Commerce
Clause); id. at 1966 (remarks of Rep. Griffin) (Title II constitutional under Commerce Clause).
268. Id. at 1533.
269. Id. at 1533–34.
270. Id. at 1534.
271. Id. at 1537 (remarks of Rep. Whitener); id. at 1545 (remarks of Rep. Forrester) (Title II
“mak[es] shambles of our Constitution”); id. at 1606 (remarks of Rep. Dorn) (Title II destroys
Constitution); id. at 1606–07 (remarks of Rep. Jones) (Title II makes “mockery” of Constitution);
id. at 1617 (remarks of Rep. Roberts) (Title II “stretch[es] the commerce clause to the breaking
point”).
272. 110 CONG. REC. 1702 (1964); see also id. at 1515 (remarks of Rep. Colmer) (calling
certain provisions “vicious assaults upon the Constitution”); id. at 1540 (remarks of Rep.
Bennett) (Title II unconstitutional); id. at 1604 (remarks of Rep. Selden) (Title II
unconstitutional); id. at 1605 (remarks of Rep. Huddleston, Jr.) (Title II unconstitutional); id. at
1618 (remarks of Rep. Abernathy) (Title II unconstitutional).
273. Id. at 1585.
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Title II. The bill found firm support in the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment. The fact that Title II raised “a moral question” did not disqualify
the Commerce Clause as a source of legislative power. Moreover, racial
discrimination had “clear economic consequences.”274
Humphrey outlined prevailing Commerce Clause doctrine with ample
citations to precedents. Congress had power to regulate matters affecting
commerce. Congress could reach local businesses affecting commerce,
including small ones. He repeated the effects Marshall had identified months
earlier.275 The Civil Rights Cases had not addressed Congress’s authority to
regulate under the Commerce Clause. The case did limit Congress under the
Fourteenth Amendment to addressing state action and the bill, to the extent it
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, was so limited.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
A.

Congress as Moot Court

Congress’s consideration of Title II presented a dialogue on constitutional
principles in several respects. The Department of Justice presented a forceful
case for the constitutionality of Title II with supporting constitutional
arguments from sympathetic legislators like Senators Magnuson, Hart, Javits,
and Humphrey and Representatives Celler and McCulloch. Those preferring
to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, such as Senators Cooper and Monroney
and Representative Lindsay, presented an alternative constitutional theory.
The Administration was called to respond to their positions. Finally, die-hard
foes of Title II cast their arguments in constitutional terms, invoking structural
ideas related to federalism and rights of private property and free association.
These and other constitutional issues were debated at length before those
congressional committees.
In many respects, the congressional debate followed the pattern of a
Supreme Court case. Advocates on competing sides (e.g., Kennedy vs. Ervin
and Thurmond) argued the constitutional issues. They had opportunity to
respond to each other’s points and questions. At times, they were helped by
sympathetic colleagues who threw them life-lines to rescue them from hostile
questions. The principals filed legal memoranda (e.g., Justice Department
memoranda) that were supplemented by amicus filings by allies (e.g., Freund’s
brief). They relied on conventional arguments of the sort used in court—
arguments from the Constitution’s text, the framers’ intent, constitutional
structure, precedent, morality, sociological evidence.

274. 110 CONG. REC. 6535 (1964).
275. Id. at 6536.
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In some respects, the congressional hearings served as almost a moot court
for arguments the Administration later presented to the Court. Many of those
on the committees had backgrounds not too different from those on the
Supreme Court.276 Their reactions might herald those of some Justices.
The Administration’s constitutional position evolved over time. Although
it always emphasized the Commerce Clause, its reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment diminished as the legislative discussion continued. Whereas
initially Robert Kennedy predicted that The Civil Rights Cases would be
overturned, he gradually adopted a narrower view of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He rejected the licensing theory and adopted a relatively narrow
state-action theory. Title II was drafted to accommodate, rather than test, The
Civil Rights Cases, by incorporating, not stretching, the state action concept.
Although the Administration adhered to a broad vision of the Commerce
Clause, its articulation of that theory changed as the legislative process
progressed. For instance, it modified what it identified as adverse effects on
commerce as the legislative proceedings continued. Initially, it did not
emphasize protests against discrimination as an adverse effect on commerce
that justified Title II. After Kennedy extemporaneously raised that issue in
response to a question, the Justice Department began to cite it as a principal
effect. By the time it argued the Heart of Atlanta and McClung cases, this
point had become its main theory.
B.

Shaping Constitutional Choices

Yet the congressional hearings were not simply spring training for the
judicial challenge that followed. They were much more than an opportunity
for the Administration to test drive its constitutional theories. Rather, they
represented Congress discharging its duty to interpret the Constitution.277 This
essential stage of the legislative process represented the time when crucial
constitutional choices were shaped and made.
Opponents of the bill deployed constitutional arguments to justify their
position. To them, Title II represented an assault on federalism that ignored
the notion of limited government and gave no weight to the Tenth Amendment.
It disregarded limitations in constitutional text (e.g., Congress could only
regulate interstate commerce and could only reach state action) and precedent
(e.g., the Civil Rights Cases). It gave no deference to private property contrary
to the Fifth Amendment.
Proponents of the Act answered these, and other, assaults.
Notwithstanding the public outcry after Birmingham, Title II would not have
276. The Court consisted of two successful politicians (Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Black), four who had served in Cabinet or subcabinet posts (Justices Douglas, Clark, White, and
Goldberg), and three former judges (Justices Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart).
277. See generally FISHER, supra note 4, at 231–34.
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emerged from committee, or would have done so in a weakened state, had the
Administration and its legislative allies not made a convincing case that the
measure was constitutional and offered a theory to support its proposal.
By the time Title II had cleared committees, the Administration and
legislative leaders had made crucial constitutional choices. For instance, they
elected to rely primarily on the Commerce Clause. They jettisoned the
licensing theory. The breadth of the Commerce Clause allowed them to rely
on a relatively uncontroversial concept of state action. These decisions shaped
the constitutional issues later presented to the Court.
C. Congress as Constitutional Interpreter
Congressmen took seriously their duty to consider the constitutional
arguments. Their attention to constitutional interpretation was evident in their
exhaustive discussion of constitutional clauses and in questions they raised
regarding constitutional theory. Their conduct signified that they did not
believe the Supreme Court was the exclusive constitutional interpreter.
Moreover, many legislators discussed their duty to consider constitutional
issues. One of the most outspoken proponents of legislative constitutional
interpretation was Senator Strom Thurmond. Thurmond argued that a
Congressman’s oath required that “the very first step that he must or should
take is to determine, Is this legislation constitutional? And if he decides it is
not, then he shouldn’t go any further.”278 Similarly, Senator John McClellan
said legislators were “personally abdicating the responsibility with which we
are charged . . . we are failing to do our duty if we do not ascertain . . . whether
proposed legislation is constitutional according to our lights before it is
enacted. . . .”279 The view Senators Thurmond and McClellan expressed of
their duty to uphold the Constitution as they saw it certainly served their
political purposes because it justified their predisposition to oppose the
legislation. Yet their comments regarding legislative interpretation should not
be dismissed as opportunistic. Leading supporters of the bill also championed
legislative interpretation.280

278. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 849; see also 110 CONG. REC.
10,381 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) (“It is our first duty, before we vote on a bill in the
Senate, to decide whether a proposed bill is constitutional. . . .”).
279. 110 CONG. REC. 10381 (1964); see also id. at 2767 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy) (stating
that Oath Clause requires congressmen to consider constitutional issues); id. at 2801 (remarks of
Rep. Fisher) (stating that constitutional government requires legislators assess constitutionality of
proposed bills).
280. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 84.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Attorney General, do you feel Congress has the right to pass on
the constitutionality of legislation before it votes?
Mr. Kennedy. I think it certainly should consider that, Senator. I think each individual
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives should certainly consider that.
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Some wondered whether they could properly offer legislation at odds with
prevailing Court precedent. For instance, Senator John Pastore sought
reassurance that if he thought The Civil Rights Cases misconstrued the
Constitution he “would not be violating any law or violating the oath of office
if I passed or voted for another law identical to the one that was overruled in
1883, in the hope that the new Supreme Court would hold it constitutional.”281
Similarly, Senator Claire Engle asked Marshall:
Now, we all take an oath to support the Constitution, and the Constitution is
what is written in it, plus what the Supreme Court says it is.
Now, the Supreme Court, in 1883, said that a bill on all fours with what is
intended to be done here, was unconstitutional. How do we stand up and vote
for it and not violate our oaths?
Mr. Marshall. I think you would have to come to the conclusion, as a personal
matter, that the Supreme Court would not decide that case the same way
now.282

Witnesses and legislators freely discussed constitutional issues and
recognized a duty to consider constitutionality in deciding how to legislate.
Yet, most implicitly accepted the notion of judicial supremacy regarding
constitutional interpretation.283 Look again at the preceding exchanges.
Senator Pastore qualified his rhetorical question regarding his right to act at
odds with the Court’s decision in The Civil Rights Cases with the condition “in
the hope that the new Supreme Court would hold it constitutional.”284 He
implicitly conceded the Court interpretive supremacy. Senator Engle thought
the Constitution “is what is written in it, plus what the Supreme Court says it
is.”285 Finally, Marshall, one of the most learned participants in the
discussions, thought a legislator could support such legislation if he thought
the Court would not again reach the same conclusion.286

Senator Thurmond. In the oath we take as Members of Congress to support and defend
the Constitution, do you not feel we have an obligation as the very first question to ask
ourselves, “Is this legislation constitutional?” And if we conclude it is not, if any Member
concludes it is not, then we should go no further, even though the goals desired to be
obtained might be laudatory.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, I think it is certainly an important question for every Member of
Congress to consider, as I have said.
Id.
281. Id. at 252.
282. Id. at 248.
283. See, e.g., id. at 28 (statement of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (predicting the Court
would uphold Title II under Fourteenth Amendment).
284. Id. at 252.
285. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 248.
286. Id.
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Others expressed similar sentiments. “Congress doesn’t determine what is
under the interstate commerce clause. The Constitution and court decisions
determine that,”287 declared Senator Warren Magnuson. “Regardless of what
we say the Supreme Court still has the final word to declare which provision of
the Constitution allows or disallows this legislation,” said Senator Frank
Lausche.288
There was one group that rejected the idea that the Court had the final say:
the Southern foes of the legislation. In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education,289 some had denied that Supreme Court decisions bound officials
who read the Constitution differently. Governor Barnett, for instance, denied
that the Supreme Court’s decisions were “the law of the land.”290
Of course, those denying that the Court was the ultimate constitutional
interpreter were not consistent in their position. Although prepared to
challenge Brown or expansive Commerce Clause decisions, they embraced The
Civil Rights Cases. Supporters of the Civil Rights Act tended to take a more
nuanced position. They accepted the Court as the ultimate interpreter and
agreed The Civil Rights Cases were law. Still, they thought Congress had
grounds to believe the Court would not follow that old precedent and,
accordingly, Congress could pass inconsistent legislation.
The Administration’s emphasis on the Commerce Clause rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment reflected an acceptance of judicial supremacy, at least

287. Id. at 71; see also id. at 72 (meaning of interstate commerce clause “depends on the
interpretation by the courts of the Constitution”). Senator Magnuson and journalist James J.
Kilpatrick discussed this issue in the following exchange:
The Chairman. Actually we can’t stretch the Constitution and we can’t condense it. The
Constitution is there. The Court interprets it. We can’t stretch it. There is nothing we
can do to change the Constitution except through an amendment.
We can pass a bill that might look like it. Somebody might interpret that we are
stretching it a little too much or we are condensing it too much. But there isn’t a thing we
can do about the Constitution. It is there. It is as solid as that granite. It depends on how
the Court interprets it.
So when you say we can stretch it or we can condense it, that is not true. We have no
authority to do one or the other.
Mr. Kilpatrick. Yes; your authority is to pass laws pursuant to the Constitution, and the
Constitution is what our nine friends say it is.
Id. at 430.
288. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 72; see also id. at 447 (statement
of Sen. Monroney) (referring to Court as “final interpreter of our laws”); id. at 1152 (Sen.
Humphrey) (predicting Supreme Court decision would uphold Title II if passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 248 (Marshall agreeing with Senator
Pastore’s statement that “[w]e have drifted into the habit here of speaking of decisions of the
Supreme Court as being sacrosanct, as being irreversible and irrevocable. There have been
instances where the Supreme Court overruled itself on all fours, haven’t there?”).
289. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
290. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 393.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1134

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1095

as a fact of life. It recognized that The Civil Rights Cases made reliance on the
Fourteenth Amendment strategically treacherous. This decision itself reflected
a realization that many congressmen would defer to Supreme Court precedent,
even one eighty years old. The belief that the Fourteenth Amendment
approach “adds a very heavy burden to the bill”291 was implicitly based upon
the Administration’s appreciation of the power of the belief of the Court as the
ultimate constitutional interpreter. Moreover, the Administration relied
heavily on judicial precedent in justifying reliance on the Commerce Clause.292
Congress’s deference to the Court extended to the manner in which it
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, Title II did not follow the
Cooper–Dodd–Lindsay approach of viewing licensing or regulating as state
action because only Justice Douglas seemed disposed to embrace that position.
Instead, Congress essentially incorporated a narrow state-action concept
consistent with judicial precedent.
Yet Congress’s deference to judicial precedent was reciprocated in the
Court’s deference to Congress. Regardless of whether one viewed the Court as
the ultimate constitutional interpreter or not, Congress clearly had a significant
role in constitutional interpretation in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court, particularly under the Commerce Clause, had accepted
congressional legislation for close to thirty years after subjecting it to a relaxed
standard of review. United States v. Darby293 and Wickard v. Filburn294 had
defined the Commerce Clause to afford little judicial scrutiny of legislative
choice. By resting the Civil Rights Act on the Commerce Clause, the political
branches legislated in an area where their conduct enjoyed a generous
presumption of validity.295
D. The Court Defers to Congress: Bell v. Maryland
The Court’s deference to Congress in making constitutional choices
became evident as the Civil Rights Act moved to passage in late 1963 and
early 1964. While Congress addressed the Civil Rights legislation in the
summer and fall of 1963, the Court considered Bell v. Maryland296 and four
related “sit-in” cases, some of which raised the issue of whether the Equal
Protection Clause prohibited the owner of a private restaurant from excluding
customers based on their race. The sit-in cases decided during the prior term
291. Id. at 222 (comments of Asst. Atty. Gen. Marshall).
292. See, e.g., id. at 422 (Justice Dep’t Mem.) (“Supreme Court decisions have many times
sustained the power of Congress. . . .”); see also id. at 423 (identifying provisions “authoritatively
construed” and citing cases only).
293. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
294. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
295. Opponents complained of this fact. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC., 6668 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Thurmond).
296. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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had strained the Court. Several justices—Black, Harlan, Stewart, Clark—
thought the Fourteenth Amendment did not, standing alone, prohibit places of
public accommodations from declining to serve blacks based on their race.
They reasoned that a restaurant, like a home, was private property; the
proprietor was entitled to exclude persons based on race. In enforcing trespass
laws against those he wished to exclude, he was entitled to help from police,
prosecutors, and courts, and their activity in enforcing private choice was not
state action. Justices Douglas and Goldberg, however, distinguished between
the home (where the owner could exclude based on race) and places serving
the public (where he could not). The Court had been able to finesse the issue
during the 1962 term by deciding on narrower grounds. The decision had
camouflaged the degree of division on the Court. In the sit-in cases heard
during the 1963 term, as Charles A. Miller put it, “the Court fell apart.”297
Several of the cases lent themselves to resolution on narrower grounds
based upon, for instance, police activity, which arguably set a policy of
discrimination. In Bell, however, the Court “hit hard bottom,” where,
according to Chief Justice Warren, the Court got “to the raw of the
problem.”298 Bell and eleven other Negro students were convicted of
trespassing following a sit-in at Hooper’s segregated restaurant in Baltimore.
The hostess, on behalf of the owner, told the students the restaurant would not
serve them based upon their race. The owner swore out warrants and the
police arrested the students. A Maryland court convicted them of criminal
trespass.299
After discussing the case at two conferences in late October, 1963, the
Court voted, 5-4, to affirm the convictions in Bell v. Maryland. Following
Justice Black’s lead, a majority at conference did not regard state enforcement
of trespass laws at private businesses as the state action, which would bring the
case within the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet some Justices worried that such a
ruling would impair Congress’s ability to pass civil rights legislation. Justice
Goldberg reminded his colleagues that “[t]here is legislation pending” and
argued that such a ruling would “set back legislation indefinitely.”300 Justice
Brennan, too, observed that a ruling that criminal law could enforce a private
entrepreneur’s discriminatory choice would mean that “neither Congress nor
the states [could] legislate otherwise.”301 Brennan feared that such a decision
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 100 (1969).
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 38, at 719.
Bell, 378 U.S. at 227–28.
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 38, at 722.
Id. at 721; see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS
SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 511 (1983) (citing Douglas’s concern that adverse
rulings would deprive Congress of the ability to pass civil rights legislation except under the
Commerce Clause); id. at 512 (noting Warren and Brennan’s concern that an adverse ruling
would impact Kennedy legislation).
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would strengthen the hand of those opposed to civil rights legislation with the
imprimatur of a favorable Court ruling.302
Ultimately, Justice Brennan circulated a dissent from Justice Black’s
planned majority opinion in which he suggested a narrow state-law ground to
decide Bell and thereby avoid the constitutional issue. In his draft dissent,
Justice Brennan referred to Title II and predicted that the proposed majority
ruling would “inevitably enter into and perhaps confuse that debate.”303
Justice Black circulated a revised draft of his own on May 15, 1964, to meet
Justice Brennan’s concern.
It said that Bell did not “involve the
constitutionality of any existing or proposed state or federal legislation
requiring restaurant owners to serve people without regard to color.”304
During the fall of 1963 and spring of 1964, as Title II faced its course of
legislative hurdles, the Justices maneuvered in Bell with the legislation in
mind. The Court’s internal discussions reflected a desire not to prejudice the
congressional debate against Title II. The crisis was averted when Justice
Clark switched his position to abandon Justice Black’s opinion only days
before Bell was to be announced, thereby creating an apparent majority to
reverse on constitutional grounds. The case was ultimately decided,305
however, on narrow grounds which avoided the constitutional issue only ten
days before the Civil Rights Act passed.
Even so, the Court’s published opinions made clear that it had decided Bell
with an eye on Capitol Hill. Justice Brennan’s majority opinion did not reach
the Fourteenth Amendment issues or speak to the scope of Congress’s
legislative power. Ostensibly, he followed the “Court’s settled practice”306 to
give state courts first crack at assessing the impact of intervening changes in
state law. Yet this federalism rationale was not truly the animating spirit
behind the opinion. Rather, Justice Brennan sought to give Congress an open

302. See HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 230–31 (1996).
303. SCHWARTZ, supra note 300, at 517.
304. Id. at 518.
305. A memorandum Justice Douglas prepared suggests that Justice Brennan may have
adopted the non-constitutional approach when it appeared he lacked the votes to produce a
constitutional ruling in favor of reversing the convictions on the grounds that they denied Equal
Protection. Justice Brennan had originally indicated he would reverse “on Shelley v. Kraemer or
on more limited grounds.” THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 38, at
721. He then conceived of a plan to vacate the lower court ruling and remand the case for the
state court to consider whether a subsequent state law applied. When Justice Clark switched
positions, a Court majority to reverse on constitutional grounds existed, yet Justice Douglas
speculated that Justice Brennan felt unable to return to his original position (reverse on
constitutional grounds) for to do so would reveal his vacate and remand approach to be one based
on expediency. See id. at 723–25 (producing Douglas’s Mem. on Bell); Michael J. Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 274–79 (1991).
306. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 228 (1964).
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field to legislate without the distorting influence of a constitutional ruling
likely to confuse its deliberations.
Ironically, Justice Black shared a similar sentiment. He began his dissent
for himself and two others with a disclaimer asserting that the case “does not
involve the constitutionality of any existing or proposed state or federal
legislation requiring restaurant owners to serve people without regard to
color.”307 Justice Black, carefully and repeatedly, distinguished between the
limits of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and those of section 5. Bell
involved only the former. It did not involve “the power of Congress, acting
under one or another provision of the Constitution, to prevent racial
discrimination in the operation of privately owned businesses, nor upon any
particular form of legislation to that end.”308 Although section 1 only
proscribed state action, Justice Black suggested that Congress could address
private action under other constitutional provisions, including section 5. “This
section [1] of the Amendment, unlike other sections, is a prohibition against
certain conduct only when done by a State. . . .”309 Justice Black added a
footnote following the words “unlike other sections,” which referred only to
section 5.310 Clearly, the dissent’s message to Congress was that constitutional
limits under section 1 might not limit Congress’s section 5 remedial power.
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence also signalled his willingness to defer to
Congress.
While joining Justice Brennan’s opinion, he reached the
constitutional issues only to express disagreement with Justice Black’s
conclusion.311 Justice Goldberg thought, too, that section 1 afforded a right to
all Americans to be treated equally regarding access to public accommodations
including inns, restaurants, lunch counters, and soda fountains. This right did
not preclude Congress from acting to implement section 1 under section 5 or
the Commerce Clause,312 he hastened to add. Congress could “fashion a law
drawing the guidelines necessary and appropriate to facilitate practical
administration and to distinguish between genuinely public and private
accommodations.”313 That was, of course, exactly what Congress had done to
Title II. The Court’s mandate was more limited. It could “pass only on
justiciable issues coming here on a case-to-case basis.”314
Only Justice Douglas sought to claim broad grounds for the Court in
setting the boundaries. Congress was “conscientiously considering” the issue
307. Id. at 318.
308. Id. at 343.
309. Id. at 326.
310. Id. at 326 n.11.
311. Bell, 378 U.S. at 286. Chief Justice Warren joined Justice Goldberg’s opinion in full;
Justice Douglas did in part.
312. Id. at 317.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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of access to public accommodations Bell raised, yet the Court stood “mute,
avoiding decision of the basic issue by an obvious pretense.”315 The Court
should not “leave resolution of the conflict to others” but should clarify “the
issues for the Congress and for the public.”316 He, too, would find state action
in the use of the judicial machinery to enforce racial discrimination at places of
public accommodations.
In all, eight of the nine Justices (all but Justice Douglas) in Bell preferred
to allow Congress to make the initial constitutional judgments. Five of the
nine317 so expressed themselves.
E.

Shaping Judicial Choice

The constitutional analysis that the Administration and Congress made
regarding Title II ultimately impacted the work of the Court. In deciding to
rely primarily on the Commerce Clause, in rejecting the licensing theory, and
in adopting a relatively safe interpretation of state action, Congress simplified
the constitutional choices the Court faced in the litigation, which all recognized
was inevitable.
This outcome was not serendipitous.
Just as the
Administration embraced a constitutional approach likely to produce the
maximum remedy consistent with political realities in Congress, so, too, did it
seek a course most likely to resonate with at least five, and hopefully nine,
Justices. Rather than asking the Court to overturn or distinguish The Civil
Rights Cases, Congress essentially crafted Title II to minimize the relevance of
that precedent. In so doing, it eliminated an issue that might have proven
controversial for at least some Justices. Moreover, it avoided the licensing
theory that had found little support at the Court and, which in Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis,318 the Court soon rejected.
The Court had little trouble upholding the constitutionality of Title II under
the Commerce Clause when the question was presented in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States319 and Katzenbach v. McClung.320 In Heart of
Atlanta, a motel owner sought a declaratory judgment that Title II violated the
Constitution.321 He claimed Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce
Clause, deprived the motel owner of liberty and property without due process
of law, and subjected it to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment by making it serve African-Americans.322 The Heart of Atlanta
315. Id. at 243.
316. Bell, 378 U.S. at 243; see also id. at 245.
317. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Harlan, White, and Goldberg. See generally
Bell, 378 U.S. at 226.
318. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
319. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
320. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
321. 379 U.S. at 242.
322. Id. at 243–44.
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Motel was near two interstate highways and solicited interstate business.323 In
McClung, Ollie’s Barbeque sought to limit blacks to a takeout service while
serving whites in its restaurant.324 The restaurant was located some distance
from the interstate and presumably served a local clientele.325 About forty-six
percent of its food had moved in interstate commerce.326 Thus, it came within
the terms of Title II, which extended its coverage “to restaurants which serve
food a substantial portion of which has moved in commerce.”327
In Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court
essentially read the Constitution the way the Kennedy Administration and
Congress had. In Heart of Atlanta, the Court concluded that Congress
possessed ample powers under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II, thus
making it unnecessary to consider other justifications.328 The Civil Rights
Cases were inapplicable because the Court in 1883 had not deemed the 1875
Act to rest on the Commerce Clause.329 Moreover, increased mobility of
persons and goods implicated the Commerce Clause in 1964 as it had not
eighty years earlier.330
Although Congress made no specific findings regarding the adverse effects
on interstate commerce, the Court found the record full of evidence that racial
discrimination burdened commerce.331 Congress could address such activity
under the Commerce Clause if the regulated activity was commerce
concerning more than one state and had “a real and substantial relation to the
national interest.”332 The activity Title II regulated met these criteria.
Congress could address “moral and social wrong[s]” under the commerce
power especially because discrimination disrupted commerce.333 Congress
could reach “purely local” activities if they impacted interstate commerce.334
Congress was free to use any means to remove obstructions to commerce that
were “reasonably adapted to the end” the Constitution permitted.335
Similarly, in McClung, the Court had little trouble finding that
discrimination chilled commerce. As applied to Ollie’s Barbeque, the refusal
to serve a portion of the population decreased the amount of food bought
through interstate commerce to serve to customers. The diminished volume at
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 243.
379 U.S. at 296–97.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id. at 298.
379 U.S. at 250.
Id. at 250–52.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252–53.
Id. at 255.
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 262.
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Ollie’s Barbeque may have been trivial, but when aggregated with others
similarly situated, as Wickard allowed,336 it was substantial.337 Congress had a
rational basis to find that “racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and
adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce.”338 The lack of
evidence linking discriminatory restaurant services with the flow of interstate
food was immaterial given the more general proof. The Court was not going to
look over Congress’s shoulder to second-guess its choices in resolving what
Congress thought to be “a national commercial problem of the first
magnitude.”339 Subject to any textual limit, Congress’s power “in this field
[was] broad and sweeping.”340
Quite clearly, the Court deferred broadly to Congress in accepting its
constitutional judgments. Yet the fact that the branches engaged in a
constitutional dialogue did not mean they reached agreement on all points.
The Court’s rulings did not coincide perfectly with the Administration’s theory
as incorporated in the Act Congress passed. In part, the difference traced to
the fact that the Government’s argument in Heart of Atlanta and in McClung
differed in certain particulars from the case it put before Congress. First,
although the Act relied on both the Commerce Clause and section 5, the United
States relied entirely on the Commerce Clause before the Court.341 Second,
whereas Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall had argued that Congress could
reach intrastate acts that “affected” commerce, Solicitor General Cox argued to
the Court that Congress had power to reach interstate travel342 and “local
activities” that might exert “a substantial and harmful effect upon interstate
commerce”343 alone or when aggregated with others of which it was
representative.344 In McClung, the Government repeatedly referred to the
power to regulate intrastate matters “substantially affecting”345 or which
“substantially burden”346 commerce, or words to that effect. Finally, the
Government’s argument to demonstrate the requisite substantial effects took a
surprising twist. Before Congress, the Administration had argued primarily
that discrimination limited travel, impeded the movement of labor and capital,
and made certain areas unattractive sites for business or conventions. The

336. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942).
337. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964).
338. Id. at 304.
339. Id. at 305.
340. Id.
341. Brief for Appellees at 15, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (No. 515).
342. Id. at 18.
343. Id. at 18–19.
344. Id. at 18–20.
345. Brief for the Appellants at 30, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (No. 543).
346. Id. at 32.
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discrimination-leads-to-demonstrations-which-impact-commerce argument was
something of an afterthought that the Administration introduced as an auxiliary
point. Before the Court, that argument catapulted to the first rank. Racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation burdened commerce in part
because it triggered “a wide variety of protests including boycotts, picketing,
mass demonstrations and other forms of economic warfare,”347 which
discouraged business.348 Disputes which caused restaurants to close (and
accordingly not buy products from other states) would diminish interstate
commerce.349
The Court accepted Solicitor General Cox’s invitation to decide entirely on
the Commerce Clause. All nine Justices joined the opinions of Justice Tom
Clark in the two cases. The Justices had discussed whether to rest the decision
on the Fourteenth Amendment.350 Justice Clark’s opinion concluded that
“Congress possessed ample power” under the Commerce Clause and
accordingly the Court did not reach the Fourteenth or Thirteenth Amendment
arguments.351 It hastened to add that its failure to discuss these provisions did
not reflect a conclusion regarding their merits.352 Justices Douglas and
Goldberg would have also relied on the Fourteenth Amendment. In so stating,
they relied on the legislative record.
The Court accepted the argument the Administration advanced, before
Congress and in its brief, that Congress had broad power to regulate interstate
travel, including but not limited to removing intrastate obstructions to it.353
Congress could reach the “local incidents” of interstate commerce, “including
local activities in both the States of origin and destination” if they had “a
substantial and harmful effect” upon interstate commerce, the Court held in
Heart of Atlanta.354 In adopting the “substantial and harmful effect”
formulation, the Court adopted the test Archibald Cox advanced in his Brief, a
stricter measure than Robert Kennedy had suggested to Congress.355 In
347. Brief for Appellees at 23, Heart of Atlanta Motel (No. 515).
348. Id. at 23–29.
349. Brief for the Appellants at 38–48, McClung (No. 543).
350. Chief Justice Warren began the conference by arguing that the Court “should not
concern [itself] with the Fourteenth Amendment.” THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (19401985), supra note 38, at 726. Justices Black and Douglas indicated they would prefer to decide
based on the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Harlan agreed that “this is really the Fourteenth
Amendment question, not a commerce clause question.” Id. at 727. Justice Goldberg was
disposed to raise both points. Id. at 728.
351. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 253–57.
354. Id. at 258.
355. Or than the Court articulated in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941), in a
passage the Court quoted. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (Congress can regulate
intrastate activities which “so affect” interstate commerce).
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McClung, however, Justice Clark did not use the substantial effects
formulation that the Solicitor General had urged.356 Instead, he repeatedly
used formulations similar to that Kennedy and Marshall had urged in
Congress.357
In determining whether the racial discrimination worked “a substantial and
harmful effect” on interstate commerce, however, the Court largely departed
from the path Solicitor General Cox recommended. It ignored his basic
argument—that segregation gave rise to demonstrations and boycotts which
chilled interstate commerce. In a long passage in Heart of Atlanta, the Court
cited other types of evidence from the legislative record of the impact
discrimination had on interstate travel. “We shall not burden this opinion with
further details since the voluminous testimony presents overwhelming
evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel.”358
In McClung, like Heart of Atlanta, Justice Clark found the effect on commerce
in evidence the Administration presented to Congress, not that Cox argued to
the Court, although it did contain one reference to the tendency of
discrimination to create “wide unrest” which had “a depressant effect” on
commerce.359 In conference, Chief Justice Warren had argued against relying
“on any effect of demonstrations on commerce.”360
Presumably, the Chief Justice’s comment was sufficient to cause Justice
Clark to find the substantial effect in arguments which had featured more
prominently in the Administration’s case to Congress.
F.

Roads Not Taken

Proponents of the Civil Rights Act failed to develop two constitutional
arguments that might have helped shape later doctrine.
Although
Administration and legislative supporters invoked the Commerce Clause, they
placed little reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause, though that Clause
expands Congress’s other constitutional powers. Under it, Congress can use
means reasonably adapted to achieve constitutional ends.361 On other
occasions, the Court had recognized that the Necessary and Proper Clause
augmented Congress’s commerce power.362 The Clause was essentially
neglected in discussions before Congress and in presenting the case to the
Court.
356. He did quote Wickard to that effect. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302
(1964).
357. Id. at 302 (“directly or indirectly burden or obstruct interstate commerce”); id. at 303
(“affect commerce”); id. at 304 (“direct and adverse effect”).
358. Heart of Atlanta, 397 U.S. at 253.
359. McClung, 379 U.S. at 300.
360. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 38, at 726.
361. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
362. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
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Nonetheless, Justice Black relied on this Clause in his concurrence in
Heart of Atlanta. He noted that “it has long been held that the Necessary and
Proper Clause . . . adds to the commerce power of Congress the power to
regulate local instrumentalities operating within a single State if their activities
burden the flow of commerce among the States.”363 He relied on both Article I
powers in upholding the Act in Heart of Atlanta and McClung. Justice Clark
also relied on it in McClung.364
Similarly, neither the Administration nor its legislative allies developed an
argument it might have deployed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Much of
the discussion focused on ways to flex the state action requirement to allow
Congress to legislate regarding private choices. The argument assumed that
the state action requirement applied to legislative action under section 5 as well
as to the constitutional norm section 1 defined. That approach was certainly
not preposterous. It was, of course, the position the Civil Rights Cases took.
Yet neither was it inevitable. Unlike section 1, the text of section 5 did not
refer to “state” action. Furthermore, substantial evidence suggested the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended Congress to have broad
latitude to enforce the guarantees of the amendment.
In its August 9, 1963, memorandum, the Justice Department raised this
argument. In order to combat “the evil of State action causing and supporting
discrimination,” Congress under section 5 “may take in whatever additional
area is necessary to make the prohibition of the evil effective.”365 If Congress
concluded that the best way to eliminate “unconstitutional State support for
nongovernmental discrimination” was to forbid private discrimination, it could
do so without judicial review.366 Thus, section 5 operated like the Necessary
and Proper Clause. It allowed Congress to “enact any measure suited to
prevent or rectify unconstitutional State action even though it may have wider
ramifications.”367
The Administration did not push this argument. Its position, after all, was
that the Commerce Clause gave Congress all the power it needed. Why
complicate matters by pushing a subtle, somewhat esoteric argument that was
not needed to achieve legislative goals? Nor did legislators raise an argument
that required an intimacy with constitutional law few had.
In Bell v. Maryland, Justice Black certainly flagged this argument. He
repeatedly distinguished between section 1, which defined the constitutional
norm vis a vis state action, and section 5, which authorized Congress to act
more broadly. Might Congress, under section 5, have banned private

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 271 (citation omitted).
McClung, 379 U.S. at 301–02.
Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 425.
Id.
Id. at 426.
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discrimination in places of public accommodation as a means to enforce the
section 1 prohibition against state imposed denials of Equal Protection?
The Court may well have accepted the argument in 1964 had it been
presented to it as a crucial basis behind the Act. Essentially the same Court
decided two cases that recognized a broader province for section 5.368 In
United States v. Guest, six justices in two separate opinions endorsed this
theory.369 Justice Brennan, for himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice
Douglas concluded that section 5 empowered Congress “to make laws that it
concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by and arising
under” the Fourteenth Amendment even if no state actions were involved.370
Similarly, Justice Clark, for himself and Justices Black and Fortas, agreed that
“there now can be no doubt” that Congress could use section 5 to address
private action which interfered with rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.371 Less than three months later, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the
Court, with only two dissenters, held that Congress could use section 5 to go
beyond the constitutional norm set forth in the Equal Protection Clause.372
Had the Administration and Congress relied on such a theory of section 5,
perhaps the Court would have, too. Furthermore, had the Court relied on
section 5 to sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1964, perhaps later justices would
have been reluctant to narrow their interpretations of section 5 for fear of
jeopardizing the Act.
These constitutional surmises, however, are beside the point. With the
benefit of hindsight, an expanded Necessary and Proper Clause and section 5
powers might have helped protect later congressional acts. Yet it is unfair to
criticize the Administration or Congress for not leaning on these two theories
before Congress. Passage of Title II and the rest of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 required a herculean effort.
Southerners dominated important
committees and congressional rules made it difficult to overcome their
opposition. At various stages of the process, Southern legislative barons or a
small number of foes could veto the bill. Proponents of the measure had little
margin for error. They sought to reduce constitutional objections by acting
within Congress’s recognized constitutional power rather than deploying new
theories to expand that authority. In an ideal world, it would have been nice to
have insulated such theories from attack by resting the Civil Rights Act of
1964 on them. Yet it is unlikely the measure would have passed if its
proponents had tried to guarantee this constitutional expansion in addition to

368.
(1966).
369.
370.
371.
372.

Justice Fortas had replaced Justice Goldberg. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761
See generally id.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 762.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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pursuing racial justice. The paramount goal was to pass Title II, not to create
constitutional doctrine for the next century.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented the culmination of a
constitutional dialogue involving all three branches. Whereas studies of
constitutional interpretation typically focus on the Court, in this instance the
political branches played the most conspicuous constitutional role. The
predominant interpretive role of the executive and legislative branches in this
battle may be due to several factors.
First, the Kennedy Administration pushed, and Congress accepted, a
constitutional theory that rested on a power under which the Court gave
Congress great latitude. After Darby and Wickard, the political branches could
have expected judicial deference to their actions so long as they rested on some
reasonable link to commerce.
Second, the political branches took a position regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment that did not require the Court to fashion new constitutional law.
They essentially extended the Act to the recognized limits of constitutional
doctrine but no further. Because the commerce power supported Title II, they
needed only modest help from section 5.
Finally, the executive branch, the majority in Congress, and the Court were
all sympathetic to the Civil Rights Act. The political branches were not acting
at odds with prevailing Court precedent. On the contrary, the Court had
recognized civil rights claims under the Equal Protection Clause at a time
when the executive and legislative branches were barely giving lipservice to
such matters. The Court had struck down Jim Crow laws and had strained as
far as it could to find state action in the “sit-in” cases in 1962 and 1963. It was
eager for the political branches to do their part. As Joseph Rauh observed, the
Court had “been the engine that has been moving this machinery toward a
fairer treatment of the Negro.”373 It had been waiting for Congress to come
aboard, and was not about to put it off.374 The handling of Bell v. Maryland
testifies to the Court’s interest in facilitating passage of the Act. Justices
weighed the impact of Congress’s deliberations on Title II as they crafted their
positions, switched their votes, and wrote their opinions.
Still, the Court was not entirely submissive to the Administration’s
direction.
Whereas the Administration emphasized the impact-ofdemonstration-on-commerce argument in its brief, the Court relied on the other
effects on commerce it identified in congressional hearings. Had the Court
accepted this argument, some of the arguments regarding effects it later

373. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1878.
374. Id.
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rejected in United States v. Lopez375 and United States v. Morrison376 might
have seemed less attenuated.
The constitutional discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also suggests
some limitations of interpretive activity by political branches. First, Congress
was heavily dependent on the executive branch and on outside experts for the
constitutional theories that shaped the Act. The Administration and outside
scholars provided the constitutional arguments regarding the Commerce
Clause on which the Act rested. Sympathetic legislators provided important
support but did not provide much aid in developing the argument. Other
legislators were more active in articulating alternative theories, which were
essentially rejected. Those most vociferous pressed the case that Title II
violated the Constitution. In retrospect, those arguments seem frivolous and
would attract no significant voice today. Of course, in a different context, one
can imagine legislators providing the successful constitutional arguments. It
just was not the case under the circumstances present here.
Second, the needs of the legislative process created incentives to rely on
tried and true constitutional arguments rather than to push innovative positions.
Arguments that challenged prevailing doctrine were likely to attract
opposition. Thus, the Administration retreated from innovative arguments
regarding the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The passage of Title II represented a triumph of constitutional dialogue.
As the Court divided regarding the propriety of recognizing a constitutional
right to service in places of public accommodation, Congress assessed and
used its constitutional tools to confer such a right. Thirty years later, when the
Court recognized some modest limits on Congress’s commerce power in
United States v. Lopez, it consciously did so in a way that protected Title II.
Wickard, upon which Congress relied, was preserved;377 and Heart of Atlanta
and Katzenbach v. McClung were favorably cited.378 The “economic
activities” test that was introduced as the measure of when Congress could
regulate intrastate activities clearly included Title II. A Constitution that did
not preserve its essence had become inconceivable.
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